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FUNCTION OVER FORM: REVIVING THE CRIMINAL JURY'S
HISTORICAL ROLE AS A SENTENCING BODY
Chris Kemmitt*

This Article argues that the Supreme Court, as evinced by its recent spate of crininaljury decisions, has abandoned the criminaljury known to the Founders and,
in so doing, has severely eroded the protections intended to inhere in the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right. It then proposes one potentialsolution to this problem.
According to the Supreme Court, this recent line of cases has been motivated by the
need to preserve the "ancientguarantee"articulatedin the Sixth Amendment under a new set of legal circumstances. Unfortunately, the Court misinterprets the
ancient guarantee that it is ostensibly attempting to preserve by focusing exclusively on the criminal jury's formal aspects and ignoring its long-standing
historicalfunction as a quasi-sentencingbody. The author argues that both the
criminaljury known to the Founders and its English antecedent were, at heart,
sentencing bodies and that this sentencing function was essential to the Sixth
Amendment protectionspromised to criminal defendants. By recasting the jury in
the mold of simple fact-finder the modern Court has hindered the jury's ability to
interpose a body of citizens between the government and the accused, leaving the
accused without adequate protection against prosecutorial overreaching and the
various otherforms of governnnt oppression with which the Founders were concerned. The article concludes with an argument that this evisceration of the Sixth
Amendment could be remedied, at least in large part, &y informingjuries of the
sentencing consequences of their actions. This solution would not only serve to reinforce the various protections that the jury system was intended to confer upon
criminal defendants, but would create a trial dynamic which more closely adheres
to the archetype endorsed by the Founders.

"The institution of trial by jury--especially in criminal cases-has its
hold upon public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those
who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt
anonymously in the community from which they came. Moreover, since
ifthey acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose
conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this introduces a slack into
the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of
current ethical conventions. A trial by any jury, however small,

*
J.D. Yale Law School, 2005. Law Clerk to the Honorable Nancy Gertmer, United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. I'd like to extend a sincere thank you
to judge Gertmer, Allon KedernJosh Kelner, and Matthew Thurlow.
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preserves both these fundamental elements and a trial by a judge
preserves neither at least to anything like the same degree. " '

-Learned
"[Tihepresent-dayjury is only a shadow of its former self

Hand

,2

-Akhil Amar

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court insists that the criminal jury is a purely factfinding body. The Supreme Court is wrong. In reality, the criminal
jury is not, has never been, and likely never will be a mere factfinder.4 The Supreme Court's protestations to the contrary smack
of a fascination with semantics and a knowing disregard for the
jury's time-tested function as sentencing gatekeeper.
The origins of this controversy can be traced to the courts of
seventeenth and eighteenth century England. Formally speaking,
English juries were fact-finding bodies. They heard evidence, made
judgments based on the evidence, and then yielded to the judge
for the defendant's formal sentencing.5 But functionally speaking,
the jury was a quasi-sentencing body. Because few criminal trials
involved real disputes regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, the primary function of these trials was to decide the
appropriate sanction. 6 At heart, the trials were sentencing proceedings and the jury played a central role in the sentencing decision.
Instead of merely determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the jury would pass judgment on the fairness of the
punishment involved.7 When faced with an unduly harsh sanction,
the jury would act as a sentencing mitigator, either by entering a
compromise verdict in which the defendant was convicted of a
1.

United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942).

2.

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

97 (1998).

3.
See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (explaining that the jury's
province is fact-finding and the judge's is finding the law).
4.
Prior to 1670, the criminal jury was technically a pure fact-finder, or at least something reasonably akin to one. But its role has not since been limited exclusively to factfinding, nor will it be, unless the protections guaranteeing jurors immunity from punishment are removed. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. The American jury has
formally operated as a fact-finder since 1835, though practically speaking it has functioned

as a sentencing body since its inception.
5.
See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 31, 54-55 (1983).
6.
7.

Id.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
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lesser charge or by acquitting the defendant outright." As a result, a
defendant could only be sentenced if both judge and jury signed
off on the punishment.
The disconnect between form and function attendant to the
jury's early role as sentencer gave rise to the confusion visible today
in the Supreme Court's criminal jury doctrine. Because English
juries were not specifically endowed with sentencing powers, they
had to rely on fact-finding as a means of accomplishing their sentencing ends. Incapable of formally sentencing defendants, juries
would pass judgment on defendants' sentences through the manipulation of their factual findings.' If the defendant's crime
qualified for a sentence that struck the jury as unfairly disproportionate, it would tailor its factual findings (e.g., lowering the
amount of money in question or changing the site of the crime) in
order to reduce the defendant's sentence.'0 Thus, the English jury
can be formally described as a fact-finder, but practically speaking,
it acted as a quasi-sentencing institution.
The version of the jury adopted by the Founders largely mirrored the English archetype, but included a few structural
modifications. While the division of labor between judge and jury
remained the same," the American version added the general verdict and endowed jurors with law-finding powers.' 2 Both
modifications improved the jury's ability to render verdicts contrary to the evidence-the general verdict by obscuring the factual
basis undergirding the decision, and the law-finding powers by allowing the jury to directly modify the applicable law. As such, these
modifications served to further institutionalize and enhance the
jury's role as a sentencing body-a role that the jury of this period
was not hesitant to play.'3
The adoption of a hybrid jury-one concerned with both factfinding and sentencing-reflected the Founders' vision that the
jury should serve as a bulwark against government oppression and
a check against an unresponsive central government. 4 By placing
sentencing authority in the hands of this local and popular institution, the Founders ensured that individuals deemed unfit for
8.
See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
9.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
10.
Langbein, supra note 5, at 3.
11.
Id. at 2.
12.
See generally Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. Ci-n. L. Rhv. 867 (1994); Mark DeWolfe Howejuries as Judges of
CriminalLaw, 52 HARV. I. R.v. 582,590-91 (1939).
See discussion infra pp. 106-108.
13.
See discussion infra Part 1.B.
14.
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punishment (or for the degree of punishment intended by the
State) would not be sanctioned by the State (or to the extent desired by the State). Always skeptical of centralized governments
and their potential for abuse, the Founders were loath to deprive a
defendant of his most basic liberties without first interposing a
body of his peers, with
their moral values and judgments, between
6
him and the State.

The current Court continues to pay lip service to the Founders'
vision of the jury as a safeguard against government abuse. 7 But in
trying, as a doctrinal matter, to redefine the jury as merely a factfinding body, the Court has undermined the structural protections
afforded to defendants by the jury requirement and cheapened the
promise embodied in the Sixth Amendment. The Court may have
maintained formal continuity with the past, but it has utterly disregarded functional continuity. This failing is manifest in the Court's
recent jury decisions between Apprendi" and Booker.'1 Putatively motivated by a desire to save the jury from judicial aggrandizement
and restore its traditional role, the Apprendi line of cases actually
functions to reinforce the jury's role as fact-finder and prevent its
possession of more expansive powers.20
Limiting the jury to solely fact-finding is problematic for two independent reasons. First, it is historically revisionist and undercuts
the protections that the Founders intended to confer on criminal
defendants through the Sixth Amendment. Second, the Court's
position is irreconcilably, and problematically, inconsistent with its
other pronouncements respecting the jury. Recent Court cases repeatedly describe the jury as a fact-finder and work to prohibit the
jury from considering the consequences of its actions, but at the
same time the Court has consistently upheld the structural protections that allow the jury to render verdicts against the evidence. 21
The result is a jury that is neither a capable sentencer nor a capable fact-finder. Juries are psychologically inclined to consider
more than just the facts presented and the Court has protected
their right to acquit against the evidence. As such, juries will inevitably act as sentence mitigators in some circumstances, which

15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 135 & 162 and accompanying text.

18.

Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

19.
20.
21.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
See infra notes 162-174 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.
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diminishes their value as rational fact-finders.22 And because the
Court does not want the jury to consider information extrinsic to
its fact-finding role, judges deny juries access to information necessary to perform their sentence-mitigation function, thus making
them arbitrary and irrational sentencers.
The simplest solution to the Court's jury conundrum is to allow
defendants to inform juries of the sentencing consequences of
their actions. 3 By providing juries with relevant sentencing information, the Court can kill two birds with one stone. First, the Court
could restore the historical protection afforded to defendants by
the Sixth Amendment. Armed with sentencing information, the
jury could successfully defend the accused both against arbitrary or
oppressive prosecutions and against potentially unresponsive legislatures. Unduly harsh sentences could be averted through
acquittals or compromise verdicts, and prosecutors, hesitant to lose
convictions, would be more likely to charge defendants in a manner consistent with the community's standards of decency. Second,
the Court could resolve the contradiction at the core of its jury
doctrine. Allowing the jury to consider sentencing information
would enable it to more capably perform its job as sentence mitigator without undermining its role as a fact-finder.24 And, as an
additional benefit, legislatures and courts would receive objective
indicia of the community's sentiments regarding disproportionate
punishments, allowing them to more fully honor their commitments to the Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive
punishment.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines the historical
foundations of the modern jury, highlighting the relevant features
of both the early American jury and its English antecedent. Part II
discusses the modern Court's jury jurisprudence up to Apprendi,
making note of its often conflicting understanding of the jury's
appropriate role. Part III then considers the new jury cases, demonstrating the ways in which these cases achieve some measure of
formal continuity with the past, but fail to capture the essence of
the Sixth Amendment jury right. This Part concludes with an argument regarding the fundamental contradiction inherent in the
Court's jury doctrine and the problems that stem from this contradiction. Part IV argues that an easy, partial resolution to the
22.
In other words, any time a jury behaves as a sentence-mitigator, its verdict is not a
reflection of the facts governing the defendant's technical guilt or innocence.
23.
Or at least to allow defendants to request that the Court inform the jury of the sentencing ramifications.
24.
Informing juries of sentencing consequences is unlikely to increase the extent of
jury nullification substantially. See discussion infra Part IV.B.i.
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Court's jury dilemma can be accomplished by informing juries of
the sentencing consequences of their decisions prior to jury deliberations.
I.

ROLE OF THE JURY

A. EnglishJuries

In form, the English jury decided only questions of guilt or innocence, 25 but in practice, very few criminal trials of the time were
actual inquiries into the guilt or innocence of the accused. 6 On
the contrary, the vast majority of cases involved defendants who
had been caught red-handed or lacked any semblance of a credible
defense. 2 ' The primary function of the jury trial, other than to
formalize the defendant's incontestable guilt, was to determine the
punishment. These trials were sentencing proceedings, first and
foremost, and the jury played a central role.28
Because English law defined felonies as crimes punishable by
death,29 the jury's only opportunity to spare the life of most defendants was to return a verdict of not guilty. The defense counsel's
main responsibility in such proceedings was to paint a sympathetic
portrait of the defendant or his crime to convince the jury to return a verdict that spared the defendant's life. 3 This changed in
1717, when Parliament enacted legislation that revolutionized
criminal punishment by making certain crimes "clergyable," or
subject to the privilege of clergy. 1 Originally, the privilege of clergy
was a means by which clerics accused of crimes were released to the
ecclesiastical court and spared trial in secular court.2 But over time

the privilege was secularized and extended to an increasing num25.

THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON

26.

1200-1800 365 (1985).
Langbein, supranote 5, at 41.

27.

Id.

THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIALJURY

28.
See id.; Green, supra note 25, at 379 (explaining that the main role of the jury was
not to serve as a bulwark against tyranny, but as a sentencing mitigator); Colleen P. Murphy,
Integrating the ConstitutionalAuthority of Civil and CriminalJuries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723,
783 (1993); see also Green, supra note 25, at 282 ("Assessment of guilt by the jury ... was
frequently made into a test, in the most general sense, of the defendant's just deserts.").
29.
English law provided that "every Person attainted of Felony .. . shall lose his Life,
and be hanged between Heaven and Earth, as unworthy of both." MICHAEL DALTON, THE
COUNTREY JUSTICE 403 (London 1682). At the time, approximately 230 different crimes
were punishable by death. See Kristin K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructingthe Jury About
Mandatory Sentencing Consequences,95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1256 (1995).
30.
See Langbein, supra note 5, at 41.
31.
Id. at 40.
32.
See id. at 37-41.
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ber of defendants. By the end of the Middle Ages it had been extended to all individuals who could prove their literacy to the
presiding judge," and in 1576 the role of ecclesiastical courts was
completely eliminated by the legislature. Clergy was thus completely divorced from its original function and transformed into
nothing more than a license for literate males to commit one felony without fear of punishment, other than a little thumb
branding.
The legislature eventually decided that this development was
unacceptable and began to place limits on the application of the
clergy privilege. Common law already excluded treason, highway
robbery, and arson of a house from this privilege, and the list was
soon expanded to include most major crimes.' Further developments extended the benefit of clergy to women, removed the
literacy requirement, and, lastly, replaced branding of the thumb
with the sentence of transportation: seven years indentured servitude in the colonies.3" In its final form, the importance of clergy to
English law could be stated quite simply: Major crimes such as treason and arson still carried the death penalty, but "[t]ransportation
replaced death as the sanction for grand larceny
and other clergy3 7
able felonies committed by first offenders.
The practical import of this development was that English juries
were given two means of mitigating the harsh sentences prescribed
by the law. For non-clergyable crimes such as murder, the jury
could mitigate punishment only by finding the defendant not
guilty.38 But in cases where a jury finding of aggravating factors

would turn a clergyable offense into a non-clergyable one, the jury
could mitigate punishment by finding the defendant guilty of the
simple, clergyable felony, but refusing to find the aggravating factors."' For instance, a defendant convicted of robbing forty shillings

or more from a home would be unable to invoke the privilege and
faced an automatic death sentence. To avoid the imposition of such
a harsh punishment, juries routinely "undercharged" the defendant

33.
Limits were placed on the privilege and defendants could only invoke it one time.
To ensure that repeat offenders did not abuse the privilege, previous claimants were
branded on the thumb. Id. at 37.
34.
Id. at 37-38.
35.
All murder, rape, piracy, highway robbery, burglary, church robbery, abduction
with intent to marry, horse-theft, and pickpocketing in excess of a shilling were made nonclergyable offenses in the late sixteenth century. Id. at 38.
36.
Id. at 39.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 39-41.
39.
Id. at 41.
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and found him guilty of stealing goods valued at only thirty-nine
shillings. °
Jurors were unashamed of using their powers of mitigation and
frequently returned partial verdicts with a less serious charge,"
even when the crime "involv[ed] thefts of money, in which downvaluing became transparent fiction. '42 While critics accused the jury
system of ad hoc justice 4S-a claim no doubt aggravated by juries'
willingness to blatantly disregard the facts-in reality, jury mitigation was far from random. Instead, jury mitigation functioned akin
to an Eighth Amendment proportionality review, with jurors exercising more leniency toward those accused of lesser offenses.
Incidences of partial verdicts correlated strongly with the type of
crime involved, and, to a lesser extent, with the character of the
accused. For instance, partial verdicts were extremely common in
situations where pickpocketing was charged capitally, but very rare
for the more serious offense of highway robbery.44 And while juries
regularly returned partial verdicts for normally law-abiding citizens,
they rarely did for professionals and gang members.
The historical prominence of jury mitigation further supports
the theory that jurors did not issue partial verdicts randomly, but
instead were conducting a form of proportionality review. For instance, jury mitigation peaked in the eighteenth century, when the
privilege of clergy was extended to all citizens, yet most crimes
were still punishable by death.46 But the legislature and courts
eventually responded to the systematic nullification of capital sentencing laws by implementing a series of doctrinal and institutional
changes which incorporated the public's sense that criminal pun-

40.
Id. (discussing the recurrent verdicts of thirty-nine shilling robberies).
41.
Id. at 52. In Langbein's study, the jury returned such a partial verdict in 39 out of
171 cases. Id.
42.
Id. at 54. Though the blatant manipulation of facts to achieve a consensus on the
just result may seem like little more than a quaint historical anomaly, it has an interesting
analogy in the contemporary legal system. In the current American system of mandatory, or
at least semi-mandatory, sentencing, prosecutors and defense counsel often rely upon fact
bargaining and guideline factor bargaining in plea negotiations. See David Yellen, Probation
Officers Look at Plea Bargaining,and Do Not Like What They See, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 339, 339341 (1996). A study from 1992 found evidence of prosecutorial manipulation of the Sentencing Guidelines in eleven to twenty-five percent of cases. Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 526-34 (1992). A more recent analysis
suggests that this number has only increased. SeeJoseph S. Hall, Rule Il(e)(1)(C) and the Sentencing Guidelines: BargainingOutside the Heartland?,87 IowA L. REv. 587, 609 (2002).
43.

See GREEN,supra note 25, at 268.

44.
45.

Langbein, supra note 5, at 42, 53.
Id. at 54.

46.

See GREEN, supra note 25, at 288.
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ishments were too severe into the legal system.47 Between 1830 and
1840 capital punishment was replaced with non-capital sanctions
for most offenses and, as a result, the frequency of jury-based mitigation receded substantially." Thereafter, "[i]n the popular mind,
and in reality, the jury would usually adhere to the letter of the

law. ,49
Ironically, the jury's success as a petit legislative body paved the
way for its evolution into the fact-finding body it (largely) is today.
By forcing the legislature to enact a code of criminal sanctions
more in line with the community's evolving standards of decency,
the jury changed the day-to-day character of its work. Though still
endowed with sentence-mitigating powers, the jury no longer
needed to exercise those powers on a routine basis. And by abstaining from its sentencing function, the jury altered the public and
legal perceptions of its appropriate role, facilitating the modern
doctrinal cabining of the jury's function to fact-finding. Consequently, the jury's power as sentencing mitigator is more likely to
remain dormant today, even if the standards of decency manifest in
criminal legislation begin to lag behind the community's standards, much as they did in eighteenth and nineteenth century
England. Moreover, good evidence suggests that such a lag might
exist today,50 but the jury as popularly conceived is no longer capa-

ble of addressing the problem in an efficient fashion.'
B. AmericanJuries

Although the role of American juries was substantially influenced
by eighteenth century British practices, the colonists did not adopt
Anglo practices wholesale. The colonists expressed approval of the
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 288, 356.
49.
Id. at 356.
50.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004).
In both cases, the Supreme Court found that the criminal sanctions meted out to particular
classes of defendants (mentally retarded and juveniles, respectively) were disproportional
and violated the mandate of the Eighth Amendment. Though the Court does not apply the
same level of scrutiny to non-capital cases and hence, both of these examples are taken from
the capital context, there is little reason to believe that non-capital cases do not suffer from
similar disproportionality issues.
51.
Modern juries are not wholly incapable of performing this function. Though they
do retain the sentencing powers of their forebears, they no longer possess the information
necessary to exercise their power coherently, or consistently, when faced with large-scale
legislative failure. See discussion infra pp. 128-129. As discussed later, informing juries of
sentencing consequences would begin to solve this problem.
52.
See Langbein, supra note 5, at 2.
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functional role played by the English jury, but changed a number
of its formal characteristics. For example, they decided to rely
solely on general verdicts5' in criminal cases and endowed juries
with the power to determine not only the facts of a case, but also
the law.5' To some degree, these changes may be ascribed to
American political philosophy's affinity for popular sovereignty.
But much of the discrepancy may be chalked up to simple differences in the evolutionary paths followed by each institution. While
the English jury evolved from a pure fact-finding body into a sentence-mitigating body in a series of historical fits and starts, the
American experience was unencumbered by such historical traditions and Americans were able to build their system largely from
scratch.
The English jury's role as sentencing mitigator evolved in response to several historical factors. The evolution of the doctrine
of clergy played an important role, but the real catalyst was William
Penn's trial in 1670 . During the trial, the jury voiced its disapproval for state-sponsored religious persecution by refusing to
convict Penn of unlawful assembly despite clear evidence of his
guilt.56 The presiding judge fined each of the jurors forty marks

and sent them to Newgate Prison until they agreed to pay their
fines. 5' But on appeal, Justice Vaughan refused to punish the jurors
for their blatant disregard of the law and reversed their conviction,
setting the precedent that jurors could not be sanctioned even
when their verdict clearly disregarded the letter of the law.5' Consequently, the English jury's formally inelegant role, in which
jurors had to act as sentencing mitigators through the blatant manipulation of factual findings, can be explained by the historical
convergence of three factors: protection from government sanction (Justice Vaughn's ruling); doctrinal evolutions that expanded
the jury's powers of mitigation (the privilege of clergy); and the

53. At the time of the Founding juries were entitled to find general verdicts determining the defendant's guilt or innocence and were not required to return specific findings of
fact. See Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories,32
YALE LJ. 575, 591 (1922); see also GEORGE B. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL
FINDINGS BYJURIES 49 (1905); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 912-13.
54.
Seediscussion infrapp. 106-107.
55.
See Simon Stem, Between Local Knowledge and Local Politics:DebatingRationalesforJury
Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1817-19, 1822 (2002) ("Bushell's Case
arose out of an earlier case involving the prosecution of William Penn and William Mead for
preaching to other Quakers in public.").
56.
See Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
57.
SeeStern, supra note 55, at 1823.
58.
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1010.
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existence of unpopular, disproportionate sentencing laws (capital
punishment for all felonies).
Therefore, when creating their own legal institutions, the colonists endorsed the roles played by the English jury-namely,
mitigator of unduly harsh sentences and populist check on a potentially unresponsive central government-but cast aside its
inelegant form. In so doing, the colonists helped to insulate the
process of jury-based mitigation from criticism. In England, the
blatant manipulation of facts by criminal juries led critics to target
the jury's function as mitigator."' But in the United States, such
tensions were minimized through reliance on the general verdict
and by granting the jury the power to determine the law. Endowed
with such powers, the American jury had no need to rely on the
legal fiction of fact manipulation to accomplish proportionality
review.
Knowledge of early colonial practices is quite limited, but the
available evidence suggests that trials in the colonies were notable
for the presence of robust jury powers and an impotent judiciary.
In Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, colonial
judges exercised very little control in either civil or criminal trials.0
And in Rhode Island, judges held office "not for the purpose of
deciding causes, for the jury decided all questions of law and fact;
but merely to preserve order, and see that the parties had a fair
chance with the jury."' Practices in the other New England colonies reflected a similar division of labor.62
In the post-revolutionary period, legal practices became more
63
well-defined and the jury adopted three primary roles: fact-finder,
bulwark against injustice, 4 and legislature, or petit legislature.
59.
See GREEN, supra note 25, at 365.
60.
Howe, supra note 12, at 590-91.
61.
Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
62.
Id.
63.
In describing the jury as a fact-finder, I do not mean to imply that the jury's role is
limited solely to finding facts. The jury is, and always has been, a body intended to both find
the facts and apply them to the law. As the Court stated in United States v. Gaudin, "the jury's
constitutional responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to
those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence." United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995). By using the term "fact-finder," I intend to reference the jury's
powers unrelated to nullification, leniency, or the more expansive power of law-finding,
which are findamentally grounded in and derived from its fact-finding responsibilities. It
should be noted that nullification refers to the power to not apply the law, while law finding
refers more expansively to the jury's power to determine the actual law.
64.
The jury has been described as a "bulwark against tyranny," in which the government
is assumed to be the source of the tyranny. E.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 473 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). I agree that this is a function of the jury but
have expanded the terminology to "safeguard against injustice" to reflect the fact that, first and
foremost, the jury is a protection against unjust results at trial. Such injustice may flow from
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Because these functions are inextricably linked, it is conceptually
helpful to group them together. The clearest way to do so is to
think of the jury as performing two functions: fact-finder and petit
5 The task of safeguarding against
legislature/sentence mitigator."
injustice is then subsumed under each of these distinct functions.
As fact-finder, the jury protects against factually inaccurate charges;
as petit legislature, it protects against unjust, but factually accurate
charges-accurate charges with unduly harsh penalties and
charges levied under unpopular statutes passed by unresponsive
legislative bodies.
It is hardly contentious to argue that one of the primary roles of
the jury is to serve as protector against factually inaccurate charges.66
The Supreme Court asserted as much shortly- after its creation
and has maintained the same position to this day.67 As such, this
Article will instead focus on the jury's political role as petit legislature, an equally important aspect of its historical function.
Though today the jury is ordinarily characterized as a narrow,
legal institution, in the early days of the nation it was roundly regarded as a political institution. After visiting America, Alexis de
Tocqueville described the jury as "first and foremost a political institution" 68 and "a form of popular sovereignty., 69 This sentiment

was echoed by many in the colonies, and analogies between juries
and legislatures abounded.70 The Federal Farmer declared that
wrongful government persecution, in which case the jury is serving not only, quite literally,
as a bulwark against government tyranny, but also as a champion of justice, by protecting
defendants against false charges that result from simple human error. In this case, I feel that
"safeguard against injustice" is a more accurate descriptor of the jury's role.
65.
I will tend to describe the jury as both a petit legislative or political body and as a
sentencing, quasi-sentencing, or sentence-mitigating body throughout this Article, and I use
the terms almost interchangeably. While the two terms (legislative/political vs. sentencing)
are not synonymous, they generally serve the same purpose in this discussion. On a practical, elementary level the jury functions as a sort of sentencing body, though not in the same
sense as the judge. Because it can only mitigate sentences, I use the terms "quasi-sentencing"
or "sentence mitigating." But I view this function as essentially political, hence, the political/petit legislative labels. When the jury acts as sentencer, it is making a political or
legislative judgment. At heart, the jury is arguing either that it does not support a law, does
not support the application of the law to an individual, or does not support the sentence
attached to a law. All of these assertions are micro-democratic legislative judgments.
66.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 7-8 (1794).
67.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 239 (2005) (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey,
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)).
68.
ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 313 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., The Library of America 2004) (1835).
69.
Id. at 315.
70.
See AMAR, supra note 2, at 94. I do not mean to suggest that the ubiquity of such
references to the jury as a sort of legislative body meant that there was consensus on the
exact form and function that such a petit legislature would take, or even that the eventual
form that it did take was necessary to satisfy certain requirements of democratic political
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"[i] t is essential in every free country, that common people should
have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the
legislative department."7' Similarly, John Taylor of Caroline, a leading constitutional theorist of the early Republic, likened the jury to
the "lower judicial bench" in a bicameral judiciary. 7 ' The Maryland

Farmer echoed Taylor, describing the jury as "the democratic
branch of the judiciary power,"7 3 and the anti-Federalist John
Hampden extended the metaphor, explaining that trial by jury was
"the democratical balance in theJudicary power.,74
The key role ofjuries, according to Akhil Amar, was to provide a
local, popular counterweight against potential overreaching by the
central government. 75 A dominant theme in early American political thought was a fear of oppression by the government, in all of its
various manifestations. The political role of the jury was considered vital because the institution could serve as a check on abuses
by each of these potential threats to liberty. Accordingly, juries
were cited as a protection against all manner of threats to popular
76
corrupt or
those posed by: arbitrary
liberty, including•7778
7ministers,
•
deficient legislators, prosecutors,' judges," and the executive. s°
Because the jury could check such a wide range of potential threats
to liberty, many Founders believed that popular representation in

philosophy. For the purposes of this Article, I will use the term petit legislature (in connection with juries) to refer to the notion of a popular, democratic body within the judiciary,
capable of checking abuses from government officials, be they legislators or prosecutors.
71.
Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 214, 249 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
72.

JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT

209 (W. Stark ed., 1950) (1814).
Essay by a Farmer,MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 71, at 38 (emphasis omitted).
Essay y Hampden, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE
74.
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 71, at 200.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183-86
75.
(1991). However, this should not be considered the sole function played by the jury. The
institution of trial by jury also serves as an important complement to the legislature because
OF THE UNITED STATES

73.

individuals view the law differently when faced with concrete circumstances as a juror than
they do as a legislature. "As voters, people consider the perceived overall threat of crime and
tend to be harsher than when they are presented with a concrete case." Rachel E. Barkow,

RechargingtheJury: The CiminalJury'sConstitutionalRole in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152
U. PA. L. REv 33, 62 (2003). The jury also plays an important educative role in democratic
society. See ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 68, at 316.
76.

See Sauer, supra note 29, at 1247-48.

77.
Id. at 1248.
4
See AMAR, supra note 2, at 8 .
78.
79.
Id.
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
80.
74 (1967).
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the legal system through the vehicle ofjury8 trials was "more necessary than representatives in the legislature.",
In order to ensure that it could provide a check against these
various evils, the early American jury was endowed with (or retained) certain structural protections: most notably, immunity
from legal sanction, the general verdict, and the ability to find the
law. The general verdict provided a juror with what John Adams
described as not only the right, but also the duty "to find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and
Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the
Court."82 In short, the general verdict supplied the jury with the

power to nullify-that is, refuse to apply-the law. And immunity
from punishment ensured that juries could exercise this power as
they saw fit, without fear of governmental reprisal.
The authority to find the law was even more empowering than
the general verdict, as it was a power that far exceeded jury nullification. While jury nullification refers only to the jury's power to
refrain from applying the law, the jury's law-finding powers actually
enabled the jury to make substantive decisions regarding the
proper interpretation and application of relevant law. Today, juries
are routinely described as lacking the power to determine the law,83
but early American juries were explicitly granted this power and
routinely exercised it well into the nineteenth century.84
The Supreme Court recognized that the jury had a right to determine the law shortly after the founding of the country85 in
Georgiav. Brailsford.The Court reiterated the rule that:
[O]n questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, [and] on
questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But
it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes
this reasonable distribution ofjurisdiction, you have nevertheless
a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the
81.
82.

E.g., Essay by a Farmer,supra note 73, at 38.
John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right ofJuries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS
OFJOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
83.
In 1895, the Court specifically denied juries the power to find the law in the case of
Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 65 (1895). The SparfCourtdeclared that such a power was
"not in accordance with the views of any other court.., in this country or in England," and
that Georgiav. Brailsford, an earlier Supreme Court case sanctioning just such a power, "[was]
an anomaly," and may not have been correctly reported. Id. (quoting United States v. Morris,
26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815)). However, the Sparf Court's position is
substantially undermined by the fact that until 1835, the Supreme CourtJustices sitting in
circuit and other lower courts routinely issued instructions permitting juries to find the law
SeeHowe, supra note 12, at 589.
84.
See Howe, supra note 12, at 589.
85.
Hereinafter "the Founding."
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law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other
occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the
one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of
facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court [sic]
are the best judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully,
within your power of decision.""
The Brailsford decision was not anomalous. Until 1835, "lower
court judges and Justices of the Supreme Court, sitting on the Circuit courts, had time and again specifically instructed jurors that
they were 'the judges of both the law and the fact in a criminal
,
case, and [were] not bound by the opinion of the court . . .""
The importance of the jury's checking power can be seen implicitly in the Brailsford excerpt above. While the Brailsford Court's
discussion explains that courts are the best judges of the law, it
notes that this right is nevertheless reserved to the jury as well. Because juries are less capable of making legal decisions than judges,
this reservation of power to juries can not be intended to improve
the court's performance as a law-finding institution. Instead, it
must be explained as erecting a structural check on abuses of government power. The jury may be advised to defer to the superior
legal knowledge of the Court, but it retains the right to find the law
when a government entity-the legislature, prosecutor, or judgeacts in a manner inconsistent with the interests of justice, regardless of whether such action is inconsistent with the letter of the law.
Allowing juries to find, or at least nullify, the law also proved to
be valuable in the legislative sphere. In a situation quite analogous
to the English example discussed above, the jury's power to nullify
forced the early American legislatures to bring criminal punishment in line with the standards of decency prevailing at the time. " "
Though less severe than British criminal codes of the period, early
American criminal codes were still frequently draconian. At the
time of the Revolution, the colonies imposed death sentences on
all individuals convicted of a "considerable number of crimes ...
including at a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy." ' Almost immediately, colonial jurors
expressed their dissatisfaction with the harshness of these penalties

86.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1,4 (1794) (emphasis added).
87.
See Howe, supra note 12, at 589 (citation omitted). Howe proceeds to cite numerotis instances ofjust such an instruction to substantiate his claim.
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-90 (1976).
88.
89.
Id. at 289.
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by refusing to return guilty verdicts.90 The States responded by limiting the classes of crimes subject to capital punishment,9 ' but this
reform failed to provide a solution for the routine refusal of juries
rather than automatically subject them to the
to convict murderers
92
penalty.
death
Several states, led by Pennsylvania, made another attempt to
quell public dissatisfaction by limiting the imposition of the automatic death penalty to first degree murder.93 Again, the reform
failed to solve the problem as jurors continued to acquit guilty first
degree murder defendants whom they found undeserving of the
death penalty.9'4 The obvious inadequacy of ex ante legislative determinations led to the next stage of reform: granting juries
sentencing discretion in capital cases. 5 Like the British example,
this dialogic exchange between jury and legislature reveals the
valuable function played by early juries as a democratic sounding
board for criminal legislation.
By refusing to convict defendants of crimes with punishments
deemed disproportionate by current standards of decency, juries
can engage legislatures in a dialogue in which both institutions
work toward a system of punishment that is morally palatable to
the population at large. Including juries in the dialogue surrounding criminal legislation is essential because they view the law in a
valid, but fundamentally different way than either the legislature or
the general populace. 96 Though both the legislature and general
populace conduct some sort of proportionality review, be it implicit
or explicit, when considering criminal legislation, neither can replicate the valuable perspective provided by the jury. Both focus
unavoidably on the generalized threat posed by criminal behavior
and lack the immediate, concrete perspective of the jury, without
which it is impossible to assess the proportionality of the law as it
functions in practice. By allowing the jury to involve itself in the
functional vetting of legislation, the legislature will be able to make
decisions regarding criminal legislation that are based upon the
objective indicia of popular sentiment afforded by jury verdicts.
This, in turn, will lead to legislation that bears the true imprimatur

90.
Id. at 289-90.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 290.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. 290-91.
95.
Id.
96.
Though the repetition may become tedious, it is also worth noting that juries play
an important checking function here, ensuring that legislatures remain responsive to the
general public.
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of democratic approval and which is fully congruent with the constitutional promise of proportionate punishment extended by the
Eighth Amendmentf
C. HistoricalParadigm

Historically, then, the jury's role has been akin to that of the
lower house in a bicameral judiciary. And the jury's function in
criminal trials included a sentencing aspect, or at least a quasisentencing aspect, though this differed substantially from the sentencing function fulfilled by the judge. Much of the descriptive
confusion surrounding the role of the jury stems from the fact that
the jury's role has two parts, one of which is more formally apparent than the other. The first component of the jury's function is its
familiar role as fact-finder. Evidence is introduced during trial and
the jury sifts through the evidence, decides what is relevant, and
applies it to the law, thus determining whether the defendant is
factually guilty. Most accounts of the criminal jury focus on this aspect,98 but the jury plays a second important role that is frequently
overlooked. If the jury believes the defendant to be factually innocent, its job is over. But if it finds the defendant to be factually
guilty, the jury plays a second role by assessing whether its conviction of the defendant serves the greater interests of justice. This
stage also involves two inquiries: whether the defendant's conduct
truly fits within the intended scope of the crime" and, if so,
whether the punishment established for the crime is proportionate
to the offense and consistent with society's evolving standards of
decency.'00
Descriptions of the jury as representing community values and
social norms, acting as a legislature or petit legislature, protecting
97.
Seediscussion infra pp. 144-145.
98.
See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994); United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
99.
This is the inquiry Aristotle associated with moral equity. Understanding that uni-

versal law is necessarily overbroad, does a particular defendant's behavior fall within the
intended stbstantive bounds of the statute? In other words, would the legislature really intend to punish this individual, or is the individual's punishment by the legislature essentially
an accident inherent to reliance on ex ante, universal law-making? See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA
NICHOMACHEA, reprinted in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 1136-37
(W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1925).
100. One can argue that thejnry performs a third role byjudging the moral value of
the law itself, but I think this can be safely subsumed within the concept of proportionality
analysis. If the jury believes a law to be morally wrong, then it is unlikely to find the punishment required by the law to be proportional to the defendant's actions.
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the defendant from government oppression, nullifying the law, or
extending lenity to defendants all refer to this function, either in
whole or in part. The taxonomy may be confused, but each of these
concepts is concerned with the same fundamental purpose: the
avoidance of unjust convictions-be they the result of legislative
overbreadth, overzealous prosecution, legislative unresponsiveness,
discriminatory application of the law, or any other government
shortcoming-through the individualized assessment of a defendant's culpability by a local jury of his peers. After the jury has
fulfilled its role, the judge then takes the verdict rendered by the
jury and sets the punishment within the range prescribed by the
legislature (assuming that the legislature has not mandated a specific punishment for the crime, thus depriving the judge of his
discretionary function).
In a very real sense, and consistent with the historical conception of the jury, the entire trial is concerned with the question of
punishment, and sentencing is a two-step process. First, the jury
performs a sentencing screening function, applying society's evolving standards of decency to weed out cases in which the potential
punishment is disproportionate to the crime. °1 Afterwards, the
judge performs a more fine-grained analysis, using his legal knowledge and training to select the appropriate punishment within the
range assigned by statute. In the end, both judge and jury perform
complementary roles that are well-suited to their core competencies. The jury ensures that the Court does not punish individuals
whom the community does not believe to be morally culpable for
their actions-a function well-suited to the common-sense judgment of the community. The judge then ensures that the convicted
defendant receives the appropriate degree of punishment within
the parameters set by statute-a task well-suited to the legal training
and background of judges. The end result is that only those
deemed morally culpable by the community are punished, and
that those selected for punishment have an expert determine the
appropriate sanction.

101. 1 think this activity is accurately described as a sentencing function because the
jury's consideration is not the guilt or innocence of the individual, but rather, the appropriate consequences that should be assigned to his action. This is functionally identical to
sentencing. Admittedly, the jury has fewer sentencing tools at its disposal. If there are multiple counts, the jury has the option of arriving at a compromise verdict if it finds the full
punishment disproportionate, but acquittal too lenient. Otherwise the jury has only two
options: acquittal or conviction. As such, the jury would be an obviously imperfect sentencer
on its own, but as the first screening stage of a two-step sentencing function, it has all of the
tools necessary to perform its role.
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Justice requires that the appropriate parties (and only the appropriate parties) are punished, but it also requires that they
receive a punishment proportionate to their crime. Without either
step justice would not be satisfied, and without either judge or jury,
the other entity would be incapable of adequately sentencing a defendant. Judges are ill-equipped to reflect the values of the
community and juries are ill-equipped to make fine-grained legal
determinations. The structure of the jury system recognizes the
value of this institutional symbiosis and allows for each party's
strengths to cover the weaknesses of the other.
In a sense, this distribution of sentencing authority may also be
inevitable. Because jurors who engage in nullification cannot be
prosecuted,'0 2 and judges cannot overturn their verdicts or acquittals,jury sentencing is likely to be unavoidable. Studies suggest that
jurors alter their verdicts based upon their prediction of the punishment faced by the defendant 0 3 and that nullification occurs
even when jurors are instructed that they have a legal obligation to
apply the law."' Consequently, jury sentencing may not only be an
advantage of the Anglo-American criminal trial, it may also be a
feature inherent in it.
II.

THE MODERN JURY

The doctrinal conception of the modern jury bears little more
than a passing resemblance to early English and American juries.
Instead of emphasizing the jury's role as a petit legislature, 10 5 modern courts have scaled back the official powers of the jury,
redefining it as an institution concerned solely with factual determinations and protection against government oppression."'
102. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
103. See Barkow, supra note 75, at 81. Even mock jurors in studies are markedly impacted by their perception of consequences, despite knowing that no punishment will ever
really occur. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 166 n.69 (1988).
104. Kalven & Zeisel's study found that twenty-one percent ofjuries nullified the law either consciously or subconsciously. See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant , 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 159, 173 (1994).
105. Though the English never used this term to describe the institution of the jury, it
bears a substantial degree of functional similarity to the role played by the early American

jury.
106. When modern courts speak of the jury's role as a bulwark against government oppression, they do not put the same expansive gloss on the terms as their historical
counterparts. Instead, they typically intend to convey only the notion that the jury will protect the defendant against groundless charges. See, e.g., Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466,
477 (2000) (describing the jury's role as a bulwark against oppression only in terms of its
truth-seeking component).
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Consistency is in; individualized determinations are out.' °7 But despite attempts to redefine the jury as nothing more than an
antiseptic fact-finder, structural vestiges of the jury's earlier role
remain, complicating attempts at easy classification. Compounding
the difficulties with easy classification, courts routinely vindicate
these structural elements of the jury, but frequently do so while
describing the jury as fact-finder or with vague language that obscures the rationale supporting their decision. 10 As such, it is not
clear whether the courts have preserved these vestiges of the jury
because of a concern for the jury's historical role or out of a more
limited concern for preserving certain formal aspects of the jury.
A. TheJury as Fact-Finder

The party line typically hewn to by modern American courts is
that the jury exists merely to find facts: juries make factual determinations and judges sentence, end of story.' °9 As such, jurors are
not told of the consequences of their decisions and, because the
criminal code has become so complex, they have little chance of
knowing what result will follow conviction. According to the Supreme Court, this is as it should be, for the basic division of labor
between judge and jury requires that juries not consider the consequences of their verdict." In the Court's opinion, " [t]he jury's
function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts,
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by contrast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived
at a guilty verdict."' Informing jurors of the consequences of their
actions 2must be avoided because of the risk of distraction and confusion."

In a similar vein, courts frown heavily on jury nullification. As
the Second Circuit has explained, "the power of juries to 'nullify'

107. Ironically, while criminal courts have moved toward an emphasis on consistency instead of individualized determinations of the just result, capital sentencing doctrine has
moved in the opposite direction. See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-DifferentJurisprudenceand the
Role of the CapitalJury,2 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004).

108. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
109. SeeShannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
110. Id.
111. Id. There is a narrow exception to this rule. In cases where it may be necessary to
correct a misstatement regarding the consequences, jurors may, in fact, be informed of the
actual consequences of their verdict.
112. Id.
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..is just that-a power; it is by no means a right ....

",,

The D.C.

Circuit denounced the practice even more emphatically:
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not
guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and
the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while
the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to
misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due
process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized
power. 114
In the jury nullification cases, at least, the courts have decided:
fact-finding is the sole province of the jury.
B. TheJury as ProtectorAgainst Government Oppression

Courts speak less decisively of the fact-finding/sentencing dichotomy in their discussions of the jury as a defendant's protector
against government oppression. While the Court clearly endorses
the jury's performance of this role-after all, the Court has said on
numerous occasions that the very purpose of the jury trial is to
prevent oppression by the government'

-it is not as clear why the

Court endorses it. As discussed above, protection against government oppression can either be construed narrowly, to refer only to
protection against factually inaccurate charges leveled by government officials, or broadly, to refer to any other form of injustice
perpetrated by the government against a defendant.
Duncan v. Louisiana illustrates the uncertain, and perhaps inconsistent, position taken by the Court.'16 After explaining that the
purpose of the jury trial is to protect against government oppression, the Court makes two statements that are vague at best, and
implicitly contradictory at worst. First, the Court explains that the
jury is "necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies."" 7 This rationale comports with the
narrow construction of "protection against government oppression": the jury is needed to safeguard defendants by weeding out

113.
114.
115.
145, 155
116.
117.

United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997).
United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
(1968).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
Id.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 40:1

factually groundless charges that may be asserted by one's enemies.
But then the Duncan Court confuses the picture, stating that:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased
or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the commonsense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."1 8
The first part of this passage could conceivably be read to stand
for either position. The Court could believe that the harms posed
by corrupt or overzealous prosecutors and biased, eccentric judges
are of a sort that would be totally eradicated by the jury in its factfinding role."" But the second half of the passage seems to suggest
that the important protective role played by the jury is not a factfinding role at all, but a more subjective, justice-seeking function.
There, the Court explains that a defendant is entitled to the more
"sympathetic" judgment of the jury, perhaps suggesting an entitlement to a jury that is not purely rational and whose role exceeds
that of narrow fact-finder.
Admittedly, the Court's intent is not entirely discernable. It
seems that the Court is walking a tightrope. On the one hand, the
Court wants to portray the jury as a fact-finding body. 2 On the
other hand, the Court wants to remain faithful to the Founders'
belief that the jury was an important protection against government oppression.1 21 In attempting to accomplish both goals-or
perhaps just straddling the two without clearly selecting eitherthe Court avoids discussion of the fact that the 'jury system was
meant to protect against unjust punishment perpetrated by government, not merely unjust conviction .... ,122 Explicit recognition
of the full extent of this protective role would unavoidably conflict
with the modern notion ofjury as fact-finder, making it difficult for
118. Id.
119. This is the position taken by the Apprendi Court, which asserted that the jury's role
as guardian "against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers" and "the great
bulwark of our civil liberties" is assured by juries ensuring the accuracy of all accusations
against a defendant. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). Quite subtly, the
Apprendi Court intertwined the notions of the jury as fact-finder with the jury as protector
against government oppression. Having done so, little conceptual space remained for the
"bulwark" qua protector against all other manner of injustices perpetrated by the government. Id.
120. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
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the Court to render decisions when the two dictates clash. Instead,
the Court has attempted to redefine "protection from government
oppression"-or at least equivocate as to its meaning-so that the
two doctrines are compatible. But in so doing, the Court has undermined the role carved out for the jury by the Founders as
popular protector against unjust government actions and unresponsive legislative bodies.

C. Jury as Legislature
Despite repeated assertions by the federal courts that the jury's
role is limited to finding facts and applying those facts to the law,
several Court doctrines serve to protect the jury's power to find
verdicts contrary to the law and evidence.1 23 Whether the solicitude
shown by the Court for these doctrines is the result of tacit court
approval of the jury's legislative role or simply a historical respect
for certain formal structures, the result is the same: the jury's
power to acquit against the evidence has been well protected.
This solicitude for a power often denigrated by the courts stands
in contrast to the treatment courts give to civil juries. While courts
ardently protect the criminal jury's ability to render verdicts against
the evidence, civil juries have been increasingly limited to a factfinding role by Supreme Court decisions. 124 For instance, in the
civil context, ajudge may either grant summary judgment or direct
a verdict after the parties have finished presenting the evidence in
the case, as long as the evidence is legally insufficient to provide a
factual issue for jury resolution. 2 5 Moreover, if a judge in the civil
context determines, after examining the jury's verdict, that no reasonable jury could have found the evidence necessary to render
such a verdict, the judge may set aside the jury's determination
by
26
ordering ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict.'

123. See Sauer, supra note 29, at 1250-54.
124. See Murphy, supra note 28, at 761-77. Furthermore, the additional protections afforded the criminal jury may well be in line with the intentions of the Founders. While the
Seventh Amendment-the amendment addressed to the civil jury--describes the role of the
jury as a trier of facts, the word "fact" is never mentioned in the text of the Sixth Amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

125. See Galloway v.United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (issuing a directed verdict);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1902) (granting summary
judgment).
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321-22
(1967) (upholding thejudgment notwithstanding the verdict against a Seventh Amendment
challenge).
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The rules regarding inconsistent verdicts reveal a similar position. When a civil jury returns an inconsistent verdict on related
counts, the judge has three options. He may issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, return the inconsistent verdicts to the
jury for further consideration, or order a new trial. 2 7 A civil judge
may also require the jury to return a special verdict in which it does
not render a general verdict of liability, but instead issues answers
to specific factual questions. 28 The reservation of such powers to
judges in civil trials demonstrates that civil juries have no constitutionally protected power to make final decisions contrary to the
evidence before them. Thus, in civil trials, juries really are limited
to fact-finding. Juries find the facts, judges find the law, and when
the jury fails to perform its role, the judge retains the power to
override the jury's decision.
In contrast, the criminal jury's power to acquit is sacrosanct and
cannot be disturbed. Unlike in the civil context, judges may not
submit special verdicts to criminal juries. 2 9 Criminal juries do not

decide narrow factual questions; they directly determine broader
questions of guilt or innocence. Also, unlike civil trials, juries retain full control over the final verdict, at least when they decide to
acquit. In criminal trials, absent express permission from the defendant, the verdict may be issued only by the jury. No matter
how overwhelming the evidence against a criminal defendant, the
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment bars the judge
from directing a verdict against him.' 3' The Court has also held
that the Sixth Amendment and the Double Jeopardy Clause forbid
a court from reversing or setting aside a criminal jury's verdict of
acquittal. 132 Similarly, judges in criminal trials are forbidden from
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b); Gallick v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108,119 (1963)
(ordering a new trial where the jury gave inconsistent answers in its verdict).
128. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
129. See United States v. Wilson, 629 E2d 439, 441-44 (6th Cir. 1980) (discussing the
reasons for not using special verdict forms in criminal cases).
130. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
131. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986); United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) ("[A] trial judge is prohibited from entering ajudgment of
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.") (citations omitted); United Bhd. of
Carpenters &Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) ("[A] judge may not
direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.").
132. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 199-200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion). "Although the prohibition on revisiting jury acquittals is most often enforced via the Double Jeopardy Clause, the finality of a
jury acquittal can be viewed as originating in the Sixth Amendment." Sauer, supranote 29, at
1252 n.119; see Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MicK. L. Rzv. 1001, 1033-34 & n.99 (1980) (arguing that the
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ordering a new trial on the basis of an inconsistent verdict from the
jury. ' While inconsistent verdicts may be a sign that the jury failed
to correctly follow the judge's instructions or was otherwise confused, courts nevertheless defend the integrity of these verdicts
because "such inconsistencies often are a product of jury lenity.
Jury lenity, according to the Court, is worth protecting because it is
part "of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check
against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive
Branch."' As the First Circuit explained, underlying these rules "is
the principle that the jury, as the conscience3 6of the community,
must be permitted to look at more than logic."
While it is clear that the Court's doctrine actively supports safeguarding the jury's ability to look at more than logic when making
its decisions, the Court has taken inconsistent positions regarding
its support for the jury actually engaging in such activity. On the
one hand, jury nullification has been described not as a right, but
rathei, as a power of the jury that should not be exercised. 3 7 On
the other hand, the Court protects inconsistent verdicts, despite
the fact that they may be the result of jury error, because they "often are the product of jury lenity.'0 3s Jury lenity is the Court's
euphemism for nullification-the power of the jury to disregard
the evidence in the name of leniency. The Court's support for lenity, and description of it as an essential part of the jury's "historic
function ... as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of
power,"' 9 suggest that the jury's role as protector of the accused is,
in fact, not coterminous with its role as fact-finder.
An exercise of jury lenity, by definition, requires the jury to disregard the evidence and render a verdict that is in accordance not
with the law but with the conscience of the community. Any such
verdict requires a consideration of the consequences; the jury's
exercise of lenity is a statement that it will not apply the law to the
evidence before it because the defendant does not deserve the
prerogative of the criminal jury to acquit against the evidence is grounded in the Sixth
Amendment right to trial byjury).
133. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 393 (1932). Note that the defendant does have some protection against irrational jury
behavior that harms him because guilty verdicts may be reviewed on appeal and will be overturned when the evidence from trial does not support the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 440 F.3d 449, 450 (8th Cir. 2006).
134. Powel4 469 U.S. at 65.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Spock, 416 F2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
137. Powell 469 U.S. at 66.
138. Id. at 65.
139. Id.
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consequences that will follow from a guilty verdict. The Court is
left in a position where it has asserted both that juries' disregard
for the consequences is a fundamental tenet of our legal system, 4 °
and that consideration of the consequences is necessary to fill the
institution's historical role as bulwark against government oppression. 4 1 In short, the Court's intent is not easy to discern.
This uncertainty of intent is also reflected in the Court's jury
composition jurisprudence. The Sixth Amendment requires a 'jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,' 4 2 and the Court has declared that " [t] he unmistakable import
of this Court's opinions ...is that the selection of a petitjury from
a representative cross section of the community is an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial.' 4 3 Taken
on their own, this pair of mandates seems to advance the cause of
the jury as impartial fact-finder only slightly. 44 The more substantial concern of each doctrine appears to be the establishment of an
institution capable of fulfilling the Founders' vision of the jury qua
legislature: a local, popular body capable of reflecting the moral
sentiments of the community and protecting defendants against
the risk of central tyranny.
But as with the structural protections discussed above, it is unclear whether the Court views these doctrines as protection for the
jury as legislature or for the jury as fact-finder. Justice Frankfurter
made the case for the latter position, arguing in dissent that:
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly
representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case .... [T]he broad representative character of the jury

should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in 45the administration of
justice is a phase of civic responsibility.

140.
141.

SeeShannon v.United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
See Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.

142.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

143. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
144. After all, a jury's ability to correctly find the facts of a case depends little on
whether the body is a local or non-local one. Similarly, a fair cross section is far less central
to the creation of a fair fact-finder than it is to the creation of a fair purveyor of community
norms. There are, however, other societal goals that also are advanced by guaranteeing a
representative jury, including issues of equality and ensuring that everyone in society is exposed to the workings of the criminal justice system.
145. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
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Seemingly in contrast, the Taylor Court approvingly cited the
Committee Report of the House from the passage of the Federal
Jury Selection and Service Act:
It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to
understand the case, but also to reflect the community's sense
ofjustice in deciding it. As long as there are significant departures from the cross sectional goal, biased juries are the
result-biased in the sense that they reflect a slanted
view of
146
represent.
to
supposed
are
they
community
the
While the Taylor passage does cite fear of bias, it defines bias as
"a slanted view of the community." The fear of bias, then, is the
fear of a jury that cannot adequately represent the views of the
community, not a body that is incapable of finding the facts of the
case. As with the Court's discussion of the various verdictprotection procedures above, the Court seems undecided as to
how it ought to view the jury. While the Court often appears to
harbor a preference for the vision of the jury as fact-finder and for
a neat fact/law, judge/jury dichotomy,14 it seems incapable of fully
escaping the cognitive dissonance inherent in holding this belief
while simultaneously protecting the jury that the Founders intended. This tension is also evident in the Court's recent
sentencing cases, which are discussed in the following section.
III.

THE NEWJURY CASES: APPRENDI THROUGH

BOOKER

In a recent series of four cases, beginning with Apprendi v. New
Jersey, the Supreme Court set out to reestablish the relationship between judge and jury in criminal trials. First, in Apprendi, the Court
reconsidered the respective roles of judge and jury in determining
facts that impact the sentences received by defendants. 148 While

under the previous regime the judge often found facts which increased the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
146. 'aylor, 419 U.S. at 529 n.7. See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 513 (1990)
(Stevens,J., dissenting) ("[A] randomly selected jury will not necessarily be 'impartial' in the
strict sense of that term, because the jurors bring to the jury box prejudice and perspectives
gained from their lifetimes of experience. But they will be impartial in the sense that they
will reflect the range of the community's attitudes ....
") (quotingJ. VAN DYKE,JuRY SELECTION PROCEDURES 18 (1977)). See alsoJeffrey Abramson, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

99-123 (1994) (explaining the evolution of the cross sec-

tional ideal over time).
147. See, e.g., Shannon v.United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
148. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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maximum, in Apprendi the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find any such fact beyond a reasonable doubt.'49
In Ring v. Arizona the Court extended the Apprendi rule to capital
punishment, explaining that ajudge, sitting without ajury, may not
find an 50aggravating circumstance necessary to impose the death
penalty.'

The jurisprudential impact of Apprendi continued to reverberate
throughout the criminal justice system, next making its presence
known in the (briefly) watershed case of Blakely v. Washington. 51 In
Blakely, the Court considered the relevance of Apprendi to Washington State's mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, and held the
Guidelines to be unconstitutional as applied. 51 2 While Blakely called
into question the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which mirrored
Washington's, United States v. Booker delivered the coup de grice.
Booker declared that the Guidelines were unconstitutional as applied and struck the portion of the
federal sentencing statute that
3
made the Guidelines mandatory.1

Collectively, these decisions attempted to reestablish the traditional relationship between judge and jury. The opinions
expressed fear that the jury had been robbed of its traditional role
and they putatively worked to restore historical jury powers that
had been more recently ceded to judges. However, a substantial
disconnect emerged between the language of the opinions and
their functional impact. While paying lip service to the historical
vision of the jury championed by the Founders and their English
forebears, the Court ignored the jury's traditional role as a petit
legislative body and opted to reinforce the modern vision of the
jury as an antiseptic fact-finder. The end result is a jury doctrine
that bears only semantic similarities to its historical predecessor
and prescribes a substantially differentjury function.
In Blakely, the Court asserted that "the very reason the Framers
put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury."5 4 The

149. See id.
at 476.
150. Ring v.Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
151. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
152. Id. at 305.
153. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
154. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308. Note that the Court's reference to "government" includes
not only the executive and the legislature, but also the judiciary. In fact, the Court specifically noted that the Framers would not "have left definition of the scope ofjury power up to
judges"' discretionary judgment. Id. The irony of the Court's statement is that the opinion
in Blakely does just what the Court said the government, including the Court itself, was forbidden to do: namely, change the role of the jury. Cf Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410
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Framers feared "that the jury right could be lost not only by gross
denial, but by erosion"155 and that ceding control of the right to the
government would only hasten this erosion. While the government
does not have explicit control over the bounds ofjury functioning,
it does have the de facto power to alter the jury's role through its
actions in other spheres. The catalyst for the Apprendi line of cases
was just such an action-or, more accurately, a series of actions-by
the government.
Concerned by the proliferation and variety of drug crimes and
their frequent connection to firearms offenses, Congress passed
new criminal legislation in the 1980s to increase the punishment
for such crimes. 5"' Congress chose to select certain aggravating facts
that would "not only authorize[], or even mandate [], heavier sentences than would otherwise have been imposed, but increase[]
the range of sentences possible for the underlying crime. '5 7 The
new legislation increased the power of the judge and decreased
both the power of the jury and the protections afforded to the
criminal defendant. Because these penalty-enhancing sentencing
facts were found by the judge and not the jury, the judge assumed
responsibility for determining the upper limits of defendants' sentences, a task previously reserved for the jury. Defendants were also
harmed, as they could now be subject to harsher sentences on the
basis of facts that
were not raised at trial or proven beyond a rea5
sonable doubt.

1

As sentencing enhancements grew, the jury was increasingly marginalized, thus diminishing the significance of its finding as to the
underlying crime. With time, the enhancements became quite substantial.' 9 Because "sentencing was no longer taking place in [its
historical tradition], the Court was faced with the issue of preserving

(1972) (arguing that the Framers intentionally left the concept of the jury at least partially
open to future debate and interpretation).
155. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 247-48 (1999)).
156. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236.
157.

Id.

158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 236 (noting that the trial judge's finding increased respondent Booker's sentence from 262 months to life and respondent FanFan's sentence
from seventy-eight to 235 months);Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1999) (noting that the trial judge's finding increased the maximum sentence from fifteen to twenty-five
years); United States v. Hammotd, 381 F.3d 316, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (MotZ,J.,
dissenting) (noting that the actual sentence increased from fifty-seven months to 155 years);
United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, CJ., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (noting increase from an approximately eighteen to fifty-four
month range to a life sentence).
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0 In the
an ancient guarantee under a new set of circumstances.'
Court's understanding, the challenge before it was to find "an answer not motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by the

need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance."1'

Doing so meant

finding a means to ensure that the jury continued to stand between
the defendant and the power of government. 2 But rather than
preserving the "ancient guarantee" intended by the Founders, the
Court instead acted to protect only the jury's fact-finding function,
while ignoring its historic functions as sentencing mitigator and
popular check on the government.
The treatment of the criminal jury in the Apprendi line of cases is
emblematic of the modem Court's treatment of the criminal
jury: I6 3 vestiges of the institution's historical form are preserved, but
on the whole, the discourse is marked by a mischaracterization of
both the jury's historical and contemporary roles. Moreover, the
vestiges of the past that are preserved are frequently in tension
with the new mold in which the institution has been recast. The
irony of the situation is that the Court's putative goal in these cases
was to preserve Sixth Amendment substance and not merely Sixth
Amendment formalism, while in reality the Court has retained little more than formal continuities and semantic similarities.
The Court began its mischaracterization of the jury in Apprendi.
In its decision the Court stressed the importance of the jury finding every element of a crime, and remarked that "the historical
foundation for our recognition of these principles extends down
centuries into the common law." 16 This historical observation provided the foundation for the Court's attempt to preserve the
substance of the Sixth Amendment jury right. As the Court noted,
the distinction between an "element" of an offense and a "sentenc160. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237.
161. Id.
162. While the Court offered this explanation for its actions in Booker, it can just as easily serve as an introduction to the entire series of opinions issued by the Court between
Apprendi and Booker. All four opinions were a response to the rising power of the judge and
concomitant loss of power by the jury. Each opinion also asserted the power of the jury
against a different doctrine or institution that functioned to perpetuate the imbalance in
power. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
163. Arguably, it is somewhat worse because the Court not only misread the history of
the jury, thus allowing it to describe the jury as a fact-finding body, but it also recharacterized the notion of the court as a protector of the defendant. According to the
Court, the Founders intended for the institution of the jury to merely protect defendants
against factually inaccurate charges, ignoring the more robust vision of the jury qua protector entertained by the Founders. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-40; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-07; Ring,
536 U.S. at 609; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84.
164. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
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ing factor" was unknown to the Founders and, historically, the jury
was expected to find all facts which constituted the offense."5 ' Furthermore, the Court noted, "the English trial judge of the later
eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing.
The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was
meant simply to impose that sentence ....
The Court is formally correct in its historical assessment. 167 The
English jury and its early American counterpart did, in fact, find
the "offense-related facts direcdy affecting punishment," 6 and this
fact-finding was no doubt an essential function of the jury. The
Court's error is in equating this fact-finding function with the factfinding function

performed

by

the

modern jury.6

9

Though

165. Id. at 478.
166. Id. at 479 (quoting John Langbein, The English (Criminal TialJury on the Eve of the
French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 36, 36-37
(Antonio P. Schioppa ed. 1987)).
167. The Court's historical assessment, however, is more accurate in the English context
than in the American one. While the English example is formally accurate, but functionally
inaccurate, the American example is also plagued by a notable omission. The Court noted
that the early American juries played a substantial role in determining punishment because
they were responsible for finding all of the facts specific to the offense, but it failed to mention that this fact-finding function was only one of the jury's tools. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 47677. The jury was not only charged with finding all elements of the crime and relevant sentencing facts, it was also able to influence sentences through its power to nullify the law and
its power to find the law. At the time of the Founding, the jury wielded both of these powers
and was able to use both to check central tyranny. However, the Court managed to cite the
historical prominence of one practice of evidence that it is fundamental to the jury right
(fact-finding), while it shunted aside the historical existence of other practices (nullification,
law-finding) with no explanation. Id. at 476-84. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In so doing, the Court substantially skewed
its presentation of thejury's historic role.
168. See Murphy, supra note 28, at 790.
169. As a side note, I also believe the Court errs by claiming that it is performing a substantive, rather than a formal analysis of the jury by allowing it to find offense-related facts.
Though the Court noted that English judges from the late eighteenth century had little
control over sentencing, it stated that allowing judges to find sentence-enhancing facts deprives the jury of a substantive, fundamental responsibility. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479. This
might make sense had the Court not found indeterminate sentencing to be entirely acceptable. The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right is not implicated in a
system where the legislature creates a vast sentencing range and allows the judge to choose,
depending upon the existence of (likely uncharged) facts not found beyond a reasonable
doubt, the sentence within that range. Rather, it stated that the jury trial right is implicated
where the judge finds the same facts and uses them for the same purpose of increasing the
punishment. In doing so, the Court revealed that it is hopelessly mired in formalistic reasoning. The function of the jury is the same in both systems. The only thing that changes is
whether the judge determines the defendant's punishment within a statutory range set by
Congress or whether the judge changes the statutory range for the offense by finding the
same facts by the same standard of proof. The same result can be accomplished under both
scenarios. The substantive function of the jury is unaffected either way. What is affected is
how the legislature drafts criminal legislation.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 40:1

formally analogous, the two practices are substantively quite
different. In the modern system, the jury is unaware of the
punishment awaiting a defendant and, for the most part, finds facts
for the purpose of finding facts. In the eighteenth century jury
systems familiar to the Founders, the jury also found facts, but the
purpose of this fact-finding was inextricably linked to determining
the resultant punishment. As John Langbein explains, "[t]hese
trials were sentencing proceedings."170 Criminal codes were much
simpler, jurors were aware of the punishments for crimes, and the
fact-finding process was less oriented toward determining the facts
of a case 7 ' than toward allowing the jury to determine the
punishment of the defendant. Because they knew the punishment
applicable to a particular crime, juries manipulated the72 fact-finding
process to arrive at what they considered ajust result.
While this process may be formally described as fact-finding, in
substance the jury served as a check on the government's sentencing abilities. Much as the bicameral legislature could only pass laws
with the support of both Houses, the state could only punish a defendant if both judge and jury were in agreement on the
sentence. 73 If either entity thought the accused was undeserving of
the stated punishment, they could, and often did, 7 4 set him free.
Quite simply, defendants were spared when the jury did not find
them to be morally culpable or believed the punishment required
by the legislature was unjustly disproportionate to their crime. As
such, the historical archetype relied upon by the Court in Apprendi
is misleading at best, and intentionally disingenuous at worst.
Though the jury role preserved by the Court may bear formal similarities to the jury known to the Founders, in function it is little
more than a shadow of its former self and what it was intended to
be.
In order to conceal the shortcomings of its historical analysis,
the Court also appropriated the historical language used to justify
jury trials, and did so in a similarly misleading fashion. In a bit of
semiotic sleight of hand, the Court removed the language from its
170. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 41.
171. In the eighteenth century English system, for example, felonies were punishable by
only one of two sentences: death or transportation. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying
text.
172. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
173. The Court made another error of formalism in Spaziano v. F7onida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984). In Spaziano the Court averred that the "Sixth Amendment never has been thought
to guarantee" a jury right at sentencing. Id. at 459. While it is formally true that juries did
not historically play a role in sentencing, in functional terms this is exactly what they did.
174. See discussion supra Part I.A-B (examining the death penalty in the English and
American contexts).
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historical context, gave it a new meaning consistent with the
Court's modified understanding of the jury, and then used the
original language to help justify its decisions. This process is especially evident in Blakely and Booker. For instance, Blakely pays lipservice to the importance of the jury trial, noting that the right "is
no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of
power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the
people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches,
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."7 5 It is

this control that allows the jury to serve as a protector against government oppression. But the Court further stated that "Apprendi
carries out this design by ensuring that the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict. Without that
restriction, the 76jury would not exercise the control that the Framers intended."

Here again, the Court invoked the idea of Sixth Amendment
substance trumping form, and then proceeded to arrive at a formally appealing, but functionally unacceptable result. The Blakely
Court equated "control" with "control over factual determinations.' ' 77 Then the Court reasoned that as long as the jury had
control over factual determinations, it had the control necessary to
protect the defendant from government oppression as intended by
the Founders. This position is both logically and historically inaccurate. The jury system known to the Founders gave the jury
control over not only fact-finding, but sentencing as well. Juries
could determine sentences through manipulation of the offenserelated facts, through refusal to apply the law, and through finding
the law. These powers combined to give the jury the substantive
control necessary to protect defendants against government oppression.'7 Consequently, the jury's roles as fact-finder and protector
against government oppression cannot be viewed as coterminous.
The jury both found the facts necessary for punishment and, in the
process, acquitted defendants against whom the government made
factually inaccurate charges. But it also determined whether the
community found the defendant deserving of the prescribed punishment or whether the punishment was disproportionate and
oppressive, given the specific facts of the defendant's case.' 7 ' The

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part 1.B.
Compare this function, again, to Aristotle's description of "moral equity." ARisTOTLE, supra note 99, at 1136-38. Here, the jury behaves in a manner quite consistent with
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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Court conflated these two ideas, thus allowing its newly modified
version of the jury to appear consistent with the Founders' concerns that the jury retain popular control of the judiciary and
protect defendants against government oppression.
The Court engaged in a similar sleight of hand in Booker while
talking about the function of the jury. In Booker, the Court noted
that the current sentencing scheme under the Guidelines is problematic because "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the
sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding
some additional fact."'80 Again, there is a substantial disconnect
between the Court's language and the realities of the modern jury.
Common law juries "authorized" sentences in a very tangible way.
Since the criminal code was substantially simplerjuries understood
the connection between conviction and punishment and withheld
conviction when they disagreed with the resulting punishment. In
so doing, jury verdicts authorized the sentences defendants would
receive.
In the modern legal system, no such authorization exists. The
criminal code, with thousands of laws and an inestimable number
of potential sanctions, defies the understanding of the modern
jury. Juries may hazard a guess as to what punishment defendants
will likely receive, but they have no real idea. As such, they lack the
requisite information to "authorize" the sentence that results from
their verdict. Modern juries can authorize conviction-a determination that involves merely applying the facts to the relevant lawbut they are not placed in a position in which they can authorize
sentences. By'describing the jury's function as including the authorization of sentences, the Court inaccurately appropriates a
historical function of the jury--one uniquely dependent upon the
institutional arrangement that existed 200 years ago, but one that
has since been attacked by the Court-and uses it to justify a current modification to the jury. By maintaining such semantic
continuity-describing the jury as the protector of defendants
against government oppression, as a guarantor of popular control
of the judiciary, and as a body capable of authorizing sentencesthe Court can obscure the fact that it has functionally changed the
jury in ways inconsistent with the Founders' vision. Because the
jury's form has remained substantially similar and the language
used to describe it retains certain continuities, it is difficult to readmoral equity and not at all consistent with the jury's current role in advancing the cause of
legal justice.
180. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at

305).
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ily discern the extent to which the function of the jury has been
eviscerated over time. The Court only adds to this confusion by
claiming to emphasize Sixth Amendment substance over Sixth
Amendment form.
Two problems emerge from the jury doctrines announced in the
Apprendi line of cases. First, the Court has ignored the jury's role as
a sentencing body-albeit a sentencing body in fact-finder's clothing-and construed the jury as merely a fact-finding body. In so
doing, the Court has continued to transform the jury into a body
that is incompatible with the Founders' vision. The jury known to
the Founders served an essential role in the Republic by placing a
multi-purpose popular check on the central government: the jury
operated as both protector of the people against government oppression and populist check against a potentially unresponsive
central government. 8 ' The modern jury serves the first of these
functions only in part, and the second not at all. Defendants are
left with limited protection against governmental oppression and
no defense at all against unrepresentative legislative enactments.
Both shortcomings are difficult to square with the concern shown
by the Founders for abuses by centralized government, and the
emphasis on the jury as a local, populist check against that threat.
Providing an "equitable safety valve '' 1s12against
government
abuses makes sense for two additional reasons. "First, the potential
deprivation of liberty is greatest in criminal cases. An inequitable
or rigid application of an overbroad law.. . may result in the most
extreme deprivations of liberty the state can exact-criminal punishment-even when punishment is morally inappropriate."'' l
Second, the risk of this harm is actually quite substantial. Criminal
laws, like all general laws, tend to be over-inclusive. Because legislators cannot foresee all potential circumstances in which the law will
apply, it will almost inevitably be over-inclusive and punish indi8 4

viduals whom the legislature would not have intended to punish.'

This threat is especially potent in the criminal law context "given
the dynamics of crime and punishment in the political process."'8 5

181. SeeAmar, supra note 75, at 1182-83 ("[M]ost... provisions of Amendments V-VIII
were centrally concerned with the 'agency' problem of government officials' attempting to
rule in their own self-interest at the expense of their constituents' sentiments and liberty.").
The jury, which is at the heart of the Bill of Rights, was an important protection against the
central government's disregard for popular sentiment. Id. at 1183.
182. See Barkow, supra note 75,at 61.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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The Court's current position vis-f-vis the jury is also problematic
for an additional reason. Though the Court's modification of the
jury has been described as recasting it in a purely fact-finding
mold, this position requires some additional clarification. In reality, the Court has created an institution that is an awkward
combination of fact-finder and sentencer-an institution that leans
toward the fact-finding end of the spectrum. At the time of the
Founding, the jury was consistently endowed with powers that
made it a capable sentencing body: It knew the likely criminal
sanctions, could choose not to apply the law, and could actively
find the law.'86 A pure fact-finding body would be granted none of
these features: It would operate in ignorance of the law, be denied
the ability to find the law, and be structurally impeded from nullifying the law.
But the modern jury borrows incoherently from both camps. On
the one hand, the jury is denied knowledge of the consequences of
its actions or its power to nullify. Knowledge of its historical power
to find the law is also withheld, consistent with the vision of jury
qua fact-finder.1

7

But the Court has also steadfastly protected the

jury's ability to nullify the law by allowing it to render general verdicts, and render verdicts that are either insupportable by the
evidence or internally inconsistent. 18 The result is a body that can
and does engage in nullification, but does so without knowledge of
the consequences of its actions. This state of affairs is problematic
because jury nullification is, at heart, the jury's means of stating
that the defendant's actions are not sufficiently immoral to merit
the consequences established under the law. In other words, juries
exercising this option are stating that, according to the community's standards of decency, the defendant's crime does not deserve
the specific punishment a guilty verdict, or a complete guilty verdict (as opposed to a compromise, or inconsistent verdict) would
entail.
Under the Court's current jury doctrine, this moral calculus is
being applied without knowledge of one critical value: the severity
of the punishment. As a result, the jury is incapable of asserting
that the defendant's blameworthiness is undeserving of any particular punishment because the jury does not know what that
punishment is. The best they can do is hazard a guess that, at least
in most circumstances, is probably inaccurate. Consequently, the
Court has created an institution that acts neither as an efficient
186.
187.
188.

See discussion supra pp. 103-104.
See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
See discussion supra pp. 116-117.
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fact-finder, because it will sometimes ignore its fact-finding responsibilities to engage in sentencing-oriented activities, ' " nor as a
sentencing institution, because it lacks the requisite knowledge and
power to make full, informed sentencing decisions. The end result
is an institution that cannot provide the consistency afforded by a
fact-finding body, or the community's individualized determination
ofjustice afforded by a petit legislative body. Instead, it features the
negative aspects of both systems: the inconsistent, ad hoc determinations of the petit legislative body, and the inattentiveness to
unduly harsh and unjust punishments of the fact-finder.

IV. INFORMINGJURIES OF SENTENCING CONSEQUENCES

A. The Doctrine
One easy means of minimizing the tension in the Court's criminal jury jurisprudence is to allow defendants to inform the jury of
the consequences of a guilty sentence. Though providing jurors
with this information would not serve as a cure-all for the Court's
confused jurisprudence, it would function as a quick, and relatively
painless, means of reducing the jurisprudential conflict. This minor change would improve a defendant's protection against
governmental abuse of power, provide a check on unpopular
criminal legislation, allow the courts to enforce the Eighth
Amendment more diligently, and even assist the jury in its factfinding role-all without requiring a systemic overhaul of the
criminal jury system. In short, the tension in the Court's jury doctrines would be alleviated, the jury would function more similarly
to the manner in which the Founders intended, and the jury would
improve both its fact-finding and sentencing functions.
Federal courts have demonstrated a profound reluctance to allow
juries to learn of the consequences of their verdicts beforehand. To
date, only one federal court has allowed a defendant to inform the
jury of mandatory sentences attendant to conviction-the Middle
District of Tennessee, in United States v. Datcher. ° Otherwise, federal

189. As a point of clarification, I am choosing to refer to nullification, law-finding, etc.
as sentencing-oriented activities because, like sentencing, they are fundamentally related to
questions of just punishment and are little concerned with questions of factual guilt or innocence.

190. United States v. Datcher, 830 F Supp. 411 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). According to the
Datchercourt, two rights justified informing juries of the sentencing consequences of their
actions: the jury's right to information relevant to its decision and the defendant's right to
have the jury know. Id. at 415.
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courts have uniformly denied defendants' requests.'9 ' The most recent denial of such a request came in United States v. Pabon-Cruz.
Pabon-Cruz is interesting because it highlights the tension in the
federal judiciary's position on the criminal jury's role extremely
well.
Jorge Pabon-Cruz, an 18-year-old scholarship student at the University of Puerto Rico and first-time offender, was charged with and
convicted of both advertising child pornography and distributing
child pornography over the internet. 92 Contrary to what might be
expected, the advertising offense carried a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence, while the distribution offense had no manda-

tory minimum. 19 3 Prior to trial, the Government asked the District
Court, Judge Gerard Lynch presiding, to instruct the jurors that
sentencing was not their concern, and moved to preclude any
mention of the ten-year mandatory minimum. Defense counsel,
fearing that the jury would erroneously intuit that the advertising
offense was the less serious charge, countered with a request that
the Court not only inform the jury that the advertising offense was
the more serious of the two, but also inform them that conviction
carried with it a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence 92 The
Government then filed an additional request, asking to show the
jury images that had been advertised and distributed by defendant. 96 Defense counsel, in turn, agreed to stipulate to the fact that
the images constituted child pornography and attempted
to bar
97
jury.'
the
to
them
submitting
from
the Government
Before trial, Judge Lynch ruled that the Government could prepare a binder with fifteen of the pornographic images in question,
but also stated that he was leaning toward informing the jury of the
mandatory minimum sentence that Pabon-Cruz would face if convicted.'98 In Judge Lynch's mind, the two issues were interrelated:
""

191. See, e.g., United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v: Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293,
1299 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1526 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v.Delgado, 914 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.Goodface,
835 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); Chapman v. United States, 443 F2d 917, 920 (10th Cir.
1971); United States v.Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1970).
192. See generally Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d at 88-93 (recording a more in depth rendition of
the facts).
193. Id. at 88.
194. Id. at 91-92.
195. Id. at 89.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 89-90.

Function over Form

FALL 20061

I must say, I find both sides a little bit inconsistent in that respect. The defense seems to want the jury to make some kind
of a judgment about whether the penalty is appropriate for
the conduct without letting the jury see what the conduct
consists of. On the other hand, the government, which had
the opportunity to have a fact finder who would be bound to
apply the law and the evidence, chose a fact finder, I assume,
because it wanted a judgment of the community, and yet
doesn't want the community to know what it is actually judging about or what the consequences of its judgment are.19
Accordingly, he agreed both to allow the Government to submit
images to the jury and to inform the jury of the mandatory minimum sentence involved.2 0 In response to the Government's
argument that such actions contradicted the relevant legal precedent, Judge Lynch responded that he had reviewed the precedents
in question and decided to inform the jury of the minimum punishment, but to instruct them, in the normal fashion, that they
must adhere to the law. 0' Judge Lynch would therefore allow the
jury to make a more informed decision as to whether to nullify, but
would not affirmatively encourage them to do so by lending his
official imprimatur to the act.
The Government appealed Judge Lynch's decision to the Second Circuit, which agreed that 20 the
jury could not be informed of
2
t

the consequences of its actons. The Second Circuit noted that it
believed Shannon v. United States, in which the Supreme Court

held that a defendant had no right to instruct the jury as to the
meaning of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, was controlling.2°4 Furthermore, the Second Circuit stated that it found the
Shannon Court's dicta regarding the functional distinction between
judge and jury to be persuasive. °5 In Shannon, the Court explained:

199. Id. at 90.Judge Lynch's statement also highlights the fact that providing ajury with
such information would more successfully assist thejury in its role as sentencer/transftiser of
community norms because this information about the crime might otherwise be excluded
due to its lack of value for the jury's fact-finding function. While I agree that this would be a
helpfil change to the jury trial doctrine, it involves changes beyond the scope of this Article.
I do, howeve, think it may be a good idea and believe that one could admit evidence based

upon its bearing on the moral culpability of defendants.
200. Id. at 91 (referencing the Government's motion for an emergency stay and a petition for a writ of mandamus both of which the court subsequently granted).

201.

Id. at 90.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
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The principle that juries are not to consider the consequences
of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in
our legal system between judge and jury. The jury's function is
to find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by contrast,
imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived
at a guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of
a verdict is therefore irrelevant to the jury's task. Moreover,
providing jurors sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them
from their fact-finding responsibilities, and creates a strong
possibility of confusion. 6°
In sum, the Second Circuit reasoned that more information will
lead to an increased likelihood of jury nullification, and that jury
nullification is undesirable because it casts the jury in an inappropriate role that would hamper the performance of its proper, factfinding role.
This dialogue between Judge Lynch and the Supreme
Court/Second Circuit highlights the tension between the modern
and traditional conceptions of the criminal jury. Both of Judge
Lynch's decisions-to allow the Government to submit pornographic images to the jury and to inform the jury of the mandatory
minimum sentence-are inconsistent with the conception of the
jury as a pure fact-finder. Given the defendant's willingness to
stipulate to the pornographic content of the images, revealing the
content of the images could only assist the jury in its consideration
of the defendant's moral culpability. The same holds true for his
decision to inform the jury of the mandatory minimum sentence
facing the defendant.
Judge Lynch's two decisions reveal a conception of the jury
more in line with the jury as a local, petit legislature. By providing
the jury with the full range of information, the jury is implicitly
trusted to answer two questions. First, is the defendant factually
guilty? Second, if the defendant is guilty, is the defendant's moral
culpability proportional to the punishment sought by the State? In
truth, the latter inquiry also involves two questions: whether the
defendant's conduct truly fits within the intended scope of the
crime,207 and whether, if it does, the punishment established for the
crime is proportionate to the offense and consistent with society's
evolving standards of decency.
206.
207.

Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.
See discussion supranote 99.
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Granting such power to the jury is in obvious tension with the
Supreme Court's current doctrine-it is, after all, hard to deny that
such behavior is separate from fact-finding. But, the Supreme
Court's position relies on two suspect premises. First, it is not at all
clear that informing jurors of the sentencing consequences of their
decisions will lead to an increase in nullification, though it will certainly influence the jury's selection of cases in which it chooses to
exercise its power, as will be discussed infra. Therefore, it is unlikely
to erode the jury's focus on fact-finding or disrupt the jury's cognitive balance between fact-finder and sentencer. Second, the
Shannon Court's reliance on formal analysis detracts from its functional and historical understanding of the jury. Contrary to the
Court's position, informing the jury of the consequences of its actions is consistent with the jury's properly understood function,
and likely to assist the jury in both its sentencing and fact-finding
endeavors. Additionally, the Supreme Court underestimated or
ignored the advantages likely to result from informing juries of the
consequences of their verdicts.
B. The Effects

1. Jury Nullification
Part of the Second Circuit's stated rationale for denying sentencing information to the jury was a fear that providing jurors with
such information would encourage jury nullification. 20° The asser-

tion seems somewhat intuitive on its face, but is inconsistent with
the available evidence.
In United States v. Dougherty,0 9 the presiding judge refused to in-

struct the jury regarding its nullification powers. The D.C. Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling, citing a fear of unjust acquittals, 210 but Chief Judge Bazelon dissented, arguing that the jury
should be informed of its power to nullify and that internal restraints would limit the jury's willingness to acquit. 211 The available

evidence supports Bazelon's position. As a note in the Yale Law
Journal observed:
Social psychological research indicates that the internal
checks referred to by Chief Judge Bazelon are very real and
208.

Pabon-Cruz,391 F.3d at 94-95.

209.
210.
211.

United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1135-36.
Id. at 1143-44.
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that, even where he knows of his power of nullification, a juror has a strong psychological need to see the case settled
according to his sense of equity. This need should act as a restraint on the juror's feelings of sympathy for the defendant.
In light of a judge's probable influence as an authority figure
on the way the jurors perceive their own roles, an instruction
which informed the jury of its power of nullification but at the
same time conveyed the legal system's expectation that it follow the general law in reaching its verdict would likely retain
the necessary tension in the jury's role.212
As members of the community, jurors internalize prevalent notions of justice and equitable relationships and "as jurors observing
inequitable relationships, they are psychologically motivated to act
according to those shared notions in reaching a verdict and apportioning rewards and punishments.i2 1 3 Consequently, jurors are
unlikely to disregard the law and set guilty individuals free-typically
an inequitable solution-even if instructed that such behavior is
within their power.
Empirical studies also provide support for this position. In Maryland, the state constitution protects the jury's right to nullify the
law.214 Professor Gary Jacobsohn surveyed Maryland's judges to determine their views on the law's impact. 2'5 At the end of his study,
212. Note, Toward Principles ofJury Equity, 83 YALE LJ. 1023, 1051-52 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
213. Id. at 1050. This theory of equity is strikingly similar to current theories of social
norms that stress norm internalization. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 225

(1996) ("Norms are those common values of a group which influence an individual's behavior through being internalized as preferences."); Robert Cooter, The StructuralApproach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1695 (1996). Internalization
theories posit that individuals acquire a preference or taste for particular behaviors. This
taste is then internalized and the individual pays a psychological price measured in guilt,
shame, or other emotional discomfort for failure to conform. Robert Cooter, The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1695 (1996). Social
norms theory-particularly versions stressing norm internalization-are a very helpful way
of viewing the behavior of the criminal jury. Nullification is, in effect, jurors prioritizing
adherence to an established social norm over adherence to a legal rule to which they have a
less substantial commitment. But social norms also frown on individuals committing morally
blameworthy action and escaping without consequence, particularly when others are
harmed. As such, social norms theory-much like the theory of equity--suggests that juries
are unlikely to rampantly nullify the law, allowing guilty defendants to be set free.
214. Maryland's Constitution provides: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction." MD.CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXIII.
Indiana also allows juries to nullify the law. IND. CONST. art. I, § 19.
215. See generally GaryJ. Jacobsohn, The Right to Disagree:Judges,Juries, and the Administration of CriminalJustice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 571, 577-79 (1976). But see Irwin A.
Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views ofJury Power: The Nullification Debate, 1787-
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Jacobsohn concluded that "the traditional deference to the judge's
authority is not seriously, if at all, diminished by the advisory nature of judges'

instructions in Maryland."2 '

An

old English

historical example points in the same direction. Parliament passed
Fox's Libel Act in 1792, allowing jurors the right to override the
judge on matters of law, but only in circumstances in which they
functioned to mitigate the harshness of the law.21 7 Despite providing juries with an additional power to set guilty defendants free,
the new law did not make it any more difficult for prosecutors to
obtain convictions. 218
As such, it seems unlikely that merely informing jurors of the
consequences of their actions is likely to lead to a substantial increase in nullification. And if it actually did, a spike in nullification
would suggest that many of the sanctions specified by the legislature were incongruous with the community's standards of decency.
Prevalent jury dissents would thus serve as objective proof of legislative unresponsiveness to the democratic will and spur a collective
re-examination of the oft-nullified legislation.
2. Benefits of Informing the Jury
Informing jurors of the sentencing consequences of their verdicts yields three primary benefits. First, as discussed above, it
updates the role of the jury to counteract recent infringements on
the jury trial right. Second, it assists the jury in its role as fact-finder
by grounding the abstract language of "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Third, it provides an important feedback loop for both the
legislature and the judiciary concerning the proportionality of
various criminal sanctions. This would help-or force-the legislature to remain more responsive to the popular will and the
judiciary to use the objective data provided by juries to enforce the
mandate of the Eighth Amendment.
As discussed above, informing juries of the sentencing consequences of their actions is consistent with the jury's traditional
sentencing role, and permitting the release of this information to
the jury would help to minimize the contradiction in the Supreme
1988, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 165, 172-73 (1991) (suggesting that explicit nullification instructions may increase the likelihood ofjury nullification).
216. Alan Scheflin &Jon Van Dyke,Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 58-59.
217. See id.
218. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE
REV. 481, 491-92 (1968).
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Court's current criminal jury jurisprudence. Historically, the jury
functioned as a sort of sentencing gatekeeper, removing defendants not believed to be morally culpable before official sentencing
2 '9
by the judge.
This gatekeeping function was essentially a propor-

tionality test in which the jury weighed the moral culpability of the
defendant against the severity of the punishment. Criminal laws
are, at least in theory, likely to be reflective of the general will, and
because justice-based social norms and psychological preferences
for equitable results compel jurors to treat defendants equitably or
justly,juries are more likely than not to authorize sentencing by the
judge when they believe the defendant to be guilty. In most cases,
the jury will exercise its power to nullify only if the defendant's
technical guilt appears to be the result of the strict application of
an overly broad statute, the legislature is unresponsive to the general will and criminalizes actions that are not generally deemed
worthy of punishment, or the legislature punishes actions in a
220
manner viewed as disproportionately harsh by the community.
Because the jury's presumption will typically militate against the
use of its nullification powers, when the jury does decide to exercise its powers, it should be considered a potent statement of
community dissatisfaction with the government. But the value of
this statement is dramatically undermined whenjuries are deprived
of sentencing information. Nullification still occurs, but the value
of nullification as a statement of popular discontent is muffled at
best, and rendered incomprehensible at worst, by the lack of
knowledge upon which the jury grounds its decision. In order for
the jury's equitable pronouncements to have substantial value to
other government figures, these pronouncements must rest on actual knowledge of the resulting punishments. Proportionality
review requires knowledge of both punishment and culpability. If
knowledge of punishment is withheld, the jury is forced to hazard
(frequently uneducated) guesses as to the punishment. When this
occurs, the jury cannot select the appropriate defendants for sentence-mitigation and nullification provides little in the way of
useful feedback for legislatures and prosecutors. Consequently,
providing juries with sentencing information will help them to perform one of their essential functions-a function that the
government may be powerless to stop them from performing even
if it so desired-and perform it more accurately.
Two particular changes in the law make the jury's checking function especially important today. First is the criminal law's dramatic
219.
220.

See discussion supra Part L.A-B.
See, e.g., discussion supraPart I.B.i.
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increase in complexity. While eighteenth century England had
only two punishments for felonies-death and transportationnowadays, there are literally thousands of criminal laws2 and a
near-infinite range of potential penalties. As such, jury knowledge
of legal punishment is dramatically more limited today than it was
in the time of the Founders. Thus, informing juries of the sentencing consequences is markedly more important today than it was
historically. At the time of the Founding, juries could perform
their sentencing function competently without additional assistance, but in the modern world of complex, and frequently
counterintuitive, criminal laws, jurors need to be provided with an
accurate understanding of the legal sanctions that will result from
their verdict.
Increases in the breadth of criminal sanctions also support providing the jury with sentencing information. As William Stuntz
explained in a recent article, current institutional incentives are
arranged such that criminal laws will tend to be overbroad.222
Stuntz noted that legislatures are more likely to err toward drafting
over-inclusive than under-inclusive laws because they expect that
prosecutors will exercise discretion and will weed out cases that
should not be prosecuted, even though they fall within the literal
language of the law.
Erring in favor of overbreadth also helps to reduce legislative
exposure to criticism because prosecutors can criticize the
legislature if their prosecutorial abilities are impeded by underinclusive laws. Drafting over-inclusive laws limits this exposure and
actually allows the legislature to blame prosecutors if they unfairly
charge individuals under an over-inclusive law.224 The prevalence of
such overly broad laws increases the importance of the jury's
checking function and makes it more essential that the jury
understand the sentencing consequences of its verdict. The
problem is not factual guilt or innocence-an issue well within the
jury's fact-finding province-but actual moral culpability. Without
knowledge of the sentencing consequences, the jury is less likely to
understand the moral injustice of a conviction because it will be
ignorant of the actual consequences of its verdict. Accordingly, the
current predilection of legislators for over-inclusive laws provides
221. Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship:Starrs IC and the Clinton-Lewinsky
Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 721 (1999) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 87 (1999)).
222. See William Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,
549 (2001).
223. Id.
224.

See Barkow, suprfa note 75, at 62.
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an additional argument in favor of informing juries of sentencing
consequences.
The increased power wielded by prosecutors provides yet another rationale for providing the jury with sentencing information.
Overreaching by "powerful and ambitious prosecutors" was a
prominent concern for the Founders and the creation of a powerful criminal
jury was their solution to this potentially vexing
11 225
problem. With the dramatic rise in modern prosecutorial power,
the need for the checking function played by a robust jury is more
acutely felt than ever before.
Historically, prosecutorial power was constrained by the more
limited range of criminal statutes under which defendants could
be charged, and by independent judicial sentencing. 6 But
"[b]ecause the sentencing guidelines are largely 'charge-offense
based,' the eventual sentencing outcome is determined primarily
27
by the crime with which the prosecutor charges the defendant.",
By making sentencing outcomes dependent upon charging decisions, the guidelines have the unintended effect of shifting control
over criminal sentencing to the entity that controls chargingnamely, the prosecutor.2281
While the Founders were reluctant to provide any government
official with too much discretion-be they judges or prosecutorsthis shift of power from judges to prosecutors cannot be considered a benign transfer of power from one functionally similar
government entity to another. Judges, like prosecutors, may have
been distrusted by the Founders, 29 but the Founders had at least

insulated judges from political pressure through the structural protections enumerated in Article

111.2 30 As

such, the transfer of power

225. SeeAMAR, supranote 2, at 84.
226. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REv.
1471, 1474 (1993) (explaining the restraining influence of judicial sentencing on prosecutorial discretion).
227. Id. at 1475. While Booker technically changed the sentencing structure by making
the guidelines advisory instead of mandatory, early evidence suggests a lack of functional
change. See Memorandum from Linda Drazga Maxfield, Office of Policy Analysis, to Judge
Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1-2 (Mar. 14, 2005). In the months following
Booker, sixty-three percent of sentences fell within the Guideline range, two percent were
slightly above the range and thirty-five percent were below the range. Id. These proportions
are the same as the pre-Booker regime, suggesting that judges continue to implement the
Guidelines in a functionally similar, if not identical, manner.
228. See Standen, supra note 226, at 1475.
229. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 84.
230. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.") Prosecutors obviously do not enjoy either the advantages of life tenure or the nondiminution of salary guarantee.
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from judge to prosecutor has come at the expense of defendants'
protection from the State. While judges may impose the occasional
arbitrary or unjust sentence on a defendant, prosecutors are intended to act in opposition to defendants in an adversary system,
which may lead to more arbitrary sentences. The aggrandizement
of power by prosecutors means that they now occupy a comparably
stronger position than they did previously, and defendants are left
in a comparably weaker position. Not only can prosecutors charge
individuals more aggressively and increase the time per conviction
that defendants spend behind bars, but even more importantly,
they have additional leverage in plea bargaining.
Because over ninety-five percent of all federal criminal prosecutions2" ' (and a roughly similar number of state prosecutions)..
conclude with a plea bargain, the real source of prosecutorial
power, and the real opening for prosecutorial abuse, derives from
the prosecutor's enhanced bargaining leverage. Prosecutors can
now afford to threaten defendants with more oppressive punishments than under earlier sentencing regimes because the jury is
ignorant of the sentencing consequences faced by defendants and
the judge lacks the power to rein them in. By threatening more
oppressive punishment if defendants risk trial, prosecutors can coerce defendants into accepting less favorable sentencing terms
through plea bargaining. But informing the jury of the sentencing
consequences would place a practical limit on the prosecutor's
powers because truly disproportionate punishments would be rejected by the jury. Prosecutors who pursued an overly oppressive
tack would be greeted with acquittals and compromise verdicts as
jurors endeavored to align punishment with their sense of justice.
Consequently, the balance of power between prosecutor and defendant would be partially restored to its historical equilibrium, an
equilibrium maintained by the existence of a robust criminal jury.
The restoration of this equilibrium may prove especially beneficial to indigent defendants. Jeffrey Standen has argued that under
the current sentencing regime, prosecutors are likely to discriminate against indigent defendants with regard to plea bargaining
offers. 3 Standen likens prosecutors to the agents of a monopsonist
(the government), explaining that as agents, the prosecutors share
the monopsonist's incentive to price discriminate in plea bargaining negotiations. T Indigent defendants, with their typically
231.
232.
(2004).
233.
234.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 274 (2005).
See, eg.,Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 Am.CRIM. L. REV.1389, 1421
SeeStanden, supra note 226, at 1484-85.
See id. at 1477-84.
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inferior legal representatives, present an ideal target for such discrimination. According to Standen, inferior representation by
attorneys with inferior resources "should result in an increased
ability of the prosecutor to exert the monopsonist's market power
over the poor, leading to price discrimination in plea concessions.''135 If, as intuition would suggest, Standen is correct, then
providing the jury with sentencing information may provide an
important structural protection for disadvantaged defendants who
receive inadequate representation at trial. While hardly a substitute
for effective assistance of counsel, alerting jurors to sentencing
consequences should at least limit the bargaining power of prosecutors and, if cases go to trial, provide some minimum baseline of
protection for defendants who might otherwise be prejudiced by
ineffective counsel.
Alerting the jury to sentencing consequences would also help to
protect defendants from unjust results due to failures of the democratic process. "Many of the founding generation ... voiced

concern that a large-scale representative democracy could fall prey
to tyranny by an oligarchy composed of the wealthy and politically
powerful." 23 6 The jury provided a check against such a result by al-

lowing the people to maintain a modicum of direct power.3 7 While
it may be a stretch to describe the threats posed by an unrepresentative Congress as "tyrannical," it is hardly a stretch to dub
Congress an "oligarchy composed of the wealthy and politically
be a realistic concern, but popowerful." Tyranny may no longer
23s
litical marginalization certainly is.

Congress, by and large, is comprised of wealthy, white males of a
relatively advanced age. In the House of Representatives, 86% of
Representatives are male, 85% are white (non-Hispanic), and 76%
are fifty years or older.239 The Senate reveals an even less represen-

tative profile. Eighty-six percent of Senators are men, 98% are
white, and 87% are fifty years or older.240 And modern campaign

requirements almost guarantee that candidates for national office
235. Id.at 1485.
236. Sauer, supranote 29, at 1249.
237. Id.
238. John McGinnis argues that other democratic shortcomings-most notably decentralized democracy's risks of rational apathy and the leverage of special interests-may be
corrected by the jury. See John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist
CourtslJurisprudenceof Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 560 (2002). As McGinnis points
out, none of these failings of decentralized democracy is present in the small, local institution of thejury. Id.
239. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2004-2005: THE NATIONAL DATA
BooK 250 (124th ed. 2005) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

240.

Id.

Function over Form

FALL 2006]

come from affluent backgrounds. These demographic characteristics are not representative of the country and they are even less
representative of the nation's criminal defendants.
Unlike Congressmen, who tend to be old, white, and wealthy,
criminal defendants tend to be young, non-white, and poor. Prisons have been aptly described as the "nation ['s] poorhouse," 24' and
the average convicted felon "is likely to be a member of the lowest
social and economic groups in the country. 2'

42

Almost half of all

and half are non-white. 4 In
felons are twenty-four or
2001, black men were six times more likely to be imprisoned than
white men, and Hispanic men were three times as likely to be imprisoned. 5 Over the course of their lifetime, black men are more
than five times, and Hispanic men more than three times, as likely
246
as white men to go to prison.
In short, fears of democratic unresponsiveness are hardly chimerical in the context of criminal sentencing legislation. The
demographic disparity between government and governed is vast,
and the disparity between governor and prisoners is nearly incalculable. As a result, the caste from which most prisoners come is at
substantial risk of political marginalization, and lacks obvious re241
course within the democratic system .
The Founders may not have foreseen this specific concern, but
they were fully aware of the potential shortcomings of the democratic process,248 and adopted institutional protections to militate
against such problems. One such institutional response was the
creation of a robust jury trial right. The jury functioned as the sort
of micro-democratic political structure that the Founders believed
younger 4 '
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Statistics: Criminal Offender
243. See Bureau of Justice
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (scroll down the page and select the "Spreadsheet"
hyperlink under the phrase, "The number of violent crime arrests of juveniles (under age

18) and adults (age 18 or older), 1970-2002") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
supra note 239, at 250.
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See Bureau ofJustice Statistics, supra note 243.
See id.
This disconnect is only exacerbated by the role played by the Sentencing Commis-

ABSTRACT,

sion. Because of the prevalent role in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines played by a

non-democratic body, the citizenry has even less control over criminal sanctions today than
in any previous historical period.
248. See generally AMAR, supranote 2.
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necessary to ensure democratic accountability in an era of largescale representative democracy. By placing substantive, if limited,
political power in the hands of these local populist bodies, the
Founders ensured that a legislature unresponsive to the wishes of
the people was incapable of sanctioning criminal punishments
deemed unacceptable by the general populace.
The need for micro-democratic political structures to ensure
government responsiveness is even more acute at present than it
was at the time of the Founding. The dramatic increase in the nation's size and heterogeneity make the risks of group
marginalization even more pressing today. And the jury, as presently constituted, has been largely deprived of its ability to serve
this checking function. Without knowledge of criminal punishments, the jury cannot effectively check the enactment of arbitrary,
oppressive, or disproportionate punishments by the unresponsive
central government. Consequently, the jury has been deprived of
its capacity to check large-scale democracy precisely at the point
that this power became most critical.
3. Miscellaneous Jury Advantages
Providing the jury with sentencing information also provides
additional advantages unrelated to the jury's sentencing function:
namely, it helps to ground the jury's understanding of reasonable
doubt and it provides a useful feedback loop of public sentiment
for other government actors.
According to the Supreme Court, "the right to have [a] jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is a fundamental
companion right to the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. But
while the formal guarantee of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
is clear, the substantive promise behind that assertion is hazier. 249
The standard assumption made by the public and the courts is that
"beyond a reasonable doubt" demands a very high standard of
proof before one is willing to convict. 250 But empirical research "has

consistently shown that the jurors in criminal cases will often be
2 1
satisfied with much less certainty than is conventionally assumed, 5
and that decisions about where to set the standards of proof are
likely to vary from case to case. Thus, while the Court believes the
249. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
250. See Erik Liliquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt:Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 85, 86-87 (2002).
251. Id. at 88.
252. Id. at 112.
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"reasonable doubt" standard to be of constitutional magnitude,
research suggests that jurors do not distinguish between the reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence standards and,
as a result, jury verdicts are unaffected by the standards given to
juries.V' The phenomenon has a simple explanation: The words
"beyond a reasonable doubt" have no fixed, quantitative meaning
and jurors are not provided with an adequate context within which
to ground their meaning of the terms, forcing them to attempt to
do so on an ad hoc basis. 5
The term "reasonable" itself is inherently relative. What is reasonable in one context may be unreasonable in another-the
assessment is heavily context dependent. Accordingly, it makes very
little conceptual sense to tell jurors that they must find a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without providing them with
the legal sanctions faced by the defendant. Sentencing information
is necessary to provide juries with a concrete understanding of what
is at stake and a factual foundation upon which to ground their understanding of "reasonableness." Juries' common conflation of the
reasonable doubt standard with the preponderance of the evidence
standard may very well be the result of courts' attempts to insulate
juries' quasi-sentencing powers from their fact-finding powers.
By removing sentencing consequences from the jury's cognitive
universe, the jury is left to render a decision of either pure guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt or innocence. When jurors consider
"reasonable doubt" only in the abstract, separate from the tangible
consequences of their actions, they are likely to consider it a far
less substantial constraint on their fact-finding decision than if they
were affirmatively told that a guilty verdict would result in a substantial prison sentence. While it may seem reasonable in the
abstract to convict a defendant when the jury is only sixty percent
certain of his guilt, such a standard of proof may appear far less
adequate to the same jurors when they are made aware of the
twenty-year penalty that will result from their decision to convict.
Quite simply, the constitutional guarantee of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is little more than a hollow promise unless the jury
is provided with the sentencing information necessary to ground
its understanding of the concept.

253. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supranote 103, at 155.
254. Additional explanations congrlent with empirical research are that juries either
do not pay attention to or they do not understand juror instructions. See id. at 148 (arguing
thatjurors do not understand juror instructions and that verdicts do not change based upon
whether or not the jury is given instruction); Robinson, supra note 104, at 170-71 (arguing
thatjuries commonly do not understand judge instructions).
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Lastly, informing juries of sentencing consequences should
prove beneficial by providing substance to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Only
three parties are potentially available to judge the proportionality
of a criminal statute: the legislature, the judge, and the jury. The
Supreme Court has noted that "[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences

have

been exceedingly

rare., 25

5

The

Court

continued to explain that this reluctance to act upon judicial prerogative stemmed from a belief that the "Court's Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the
subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 25 6 If

the legislature has already enacted a law, thus signifying its obvious
approval, and the courts refuse to get involved without objective
indicia, then the Eighth Amendment is rendered functionally inapplicable to legislative enactments. 25 Given that the Court has
categorized some legislative acts as unconstitutionally disproportionate, 58 this position is conceptually problematic. The Court is
not arguing that legislative enactments are inherently in line with
the Eighth Amendment. It follows that it must be arguing that
while the legislature will pass laws that are unconstitutional, the
Court is so ill-equipped to determine which laws are disproportionate that, rather than enter arbitrary judgments, it will opt to
give a rubber 2stamp
approval to all criminal sanctions short of the
59
death penalty.

Informing juries of the criminal sanctions resulting from guilty
verdicts would provide the Court with objective proof of social disapproval, allowing it to more willingly enforce the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive punishment. In
Woodson v. North Carolina the Court stated that 'Jury determina-

tions" are one of "two crucial indicators of evolving standards of
255. Rummel v.Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
256. Id. at 274-75 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
257. Death penalty trials provide an exception to this general rule because death penalty sentencing allows juries to explicitly involve themselves in the sentencing process, thus
providing courts with the objective indicia of community sentiment that they require.
258. See, e.g., Roper v.Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-old defendants); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (ruling that death sentences are an excessive punishment for persons with
mental retardation); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty
was a grossly disproportionate and excessive penalty for the crime of rape); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (ruling that defendant's non-capital punishment for falsifying
documents was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment).
259. For example, "three strikes" laws may be especially problematic.
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decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society.
The Woodson court approvingly cited to numerous instances where
juries refused to convict rather than automatically sentence a defendant to death, noting that such "objective indicia" allowed it to
judge the practice unconstitutional.2 6
Similarly, providing modern juries with sentencing information
would allow them to reject sentences that are out of line with society's evolving standards of decency, thereby permitting the Court
to set such enactments aside as unduly harsh and prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. Such feedback would also percolate back to
legislators and prosecutors. Provided with this objective feedback
from the populace, legislators would be less likely to enact laws that
seemed acceptable in the abstract, but unconscionable in application, and prosecutors would be less likely to press charges they
knew to be out of line with community standards. As a result, defendants would receive an increase in both formal and functional
protection from oppressive criminal sanctions.

CONCLUSION

As the Booker Court implicitly recognized, Sixth Amendment
form is of little value without Sixth Amendment substance. 62 Yet the
Court's recent jurisprudence has consistently focused on the jury's
formal elements-specifically its formal designation as fact-finderto the exclusion of its substantive functions. The motivation for the
Court's preoccupation with form may be a historical misconception.
The Court may really believe that the jury was historically limited to
its capacity as fact-finder, but it is more likely that the Court wants
to promote consistency in criminal trials. If so, the Court's position
is understandable, if ill-conceived, but its methods are far from acceptable.
The position that justice requires consistency is far from new23
and is not without merit. Jury mitigation has been criticized as far
back as eighteenth century England and there is certainly value
inherent in a more predictable criminal justice system. The problem with the Supreme Court's attempts to achieve greater
consistency through criminal jury modifications, if that is the
Court's motivation, are twofold. First, by mischaracterizing the
260. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
261. Id. at 289-93.
262. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005).
263. The English jury was criticized by reformers as performing "ad hoc" jury mitigation. See GREEN, supra note 25, at 268.
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jury's historic role and then relying on this mischaracterization
rather than an argument regarding the value of consistency in the
legal system, the Court either locates the constitutional source of
its authority in the wrong place 2 4 or puts a constitutional imprimatur on a pragmatic, policy-oriented decision. Second, the Court
fails to appreciate that its position does harm to the Founders' vision and that this harm to the jury qua sentencer is not offset by a
related benefit to the jury qua fact-finder.
By claiming that the jury has historically served as a pure
fact-finder and that the Sixth Amendment compels the Court to
maintain substantive continuity between the jury known to the
Founders and the modern jury, the Court effectively constitutionalizes its inaccurate historical rendering. In light of the historical
evidence discussed in Parts I and II, this position is untenable. A
more historically compatible position would require that the Court
make one of two arguments. The Court could argue that the jury's
historic function does not comprise a constitutional mandate, and
that the Court is not bound by, or required to respect, the version
of the jury known to the Founders. Alternately, the Court could
argue that there is constitutional import in the jury's historical
function, but that this constitutional value is in tension with another constitutional value-say, the right to due process of law. "
Either position would be more honest and would allow for a more
robust debate on the appropriate scope of the jury's role. But simply deriving a constitutional mandate from an inaccurate historical
account does little to further debate or accurately define a right of
constitutional import.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court's recasting of the jury as a
fact-finder does little to vindicate the values of consistency that are
typically associated with the position. For one thing, the jury still
behaves as a sentencing mitigator in addition to its fact-finding activities. Even without sentencing information or court approval,
juries have continued to act as sentencing mitigators because of
the structural protections that exist to protect such behavior. Consequently, denying juries information regarding the consequences
of their behavior does not ensure that juries are appropriately fo264. For instance, claiming that the jury form supported by the Court is constitutionally
compelled because it is substantively similar to the jury known to the Framers, rather than
making an argument that the consistency achieved by redefining the jury is compelled by
due process of law.
265. Perhaps one could argue that due process of law requires the consistent application of the laws as written by the legislature and that, without consistency, there is no rule of
law. Thus, while the Court's historical function has constitutional value, that value is
trumped by the concerns attendant to the due process clause.
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cused on their fact-finding chores; instead, it ensures that when
they perform their inevitable function as sentencing mitigator, they
do it poorly.
Unless the Court reverses course and begins to dismantle the
structural protections that allow juries to find verdicts against the
facts-the general verdict, permissibility of factually impossible and
factually inconsistent verdicts, etc.-the jury will continue to behave
as a sentencing mitigator. Consequently, the Court's half-hearted
attempts to recast the jury as a fact-finder will serve only to hurt,
rather than assist, the jury in its performance of its sentencing function. But such an undertaking, with all of its violence to the jury's
historical protections, seems exceptionally unlikely.
As such, the Court should accept what it cannot change. The
jury will continue to behave as a sentence-mitigating body and the
Court is incapable of stopping it. Given this reality, the Court's best
option is to accept the inevitable and at least provide the jury with
the means necessary to perform its sentencing function capably.
No harm will be done to the jury's fact-finding. Juries already act as
sentencing mitigators and evidence suggests that access to relevant
information is unlikely to increase their sentencing activities at the
expense of their fact-finding responsibilities. As a result, the jury
will be better able to perform its sentencing function. As a matter
of simple, utilitarian calculus, the choice seems obvious. Informing
juries of the sentencing consequences of their actions would not
increase juror distraction, and it would allow juries to base their
sentence-mitigation decisions on the real consequences of their
verdicts. As a result, jury mitigation would lose its uninformed, ad
hoc character, target more deserving defendants, and serve as a
useful indicator of community disapproval for both prosecutors
and legislators to learn from.
A more difficult question, and one outside the scope of this Article, involves the appropriate balance to strike between the jury
qua sentencer and the jury qua fact-finder. Moving from the current, awkward balance struck by the Court to the position endorsed
above provides obvious benefits with few obvious harms. The Court
would continue to achieve the same performance from the jury in
terms of its consistent application of the laws, but would also begin
to promote the vision of the jury known to the Founders. But the
Court could adopt a more extreme version of the position above. If
the Court wanted to more completely reduce tension between the
jury's sentencing role and its fact-finding role, it could also endorse
a number of more substantive changes to the criminal trial. For
example, allowing evidence that related to a defendant's moral
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culpability, but was irrelevant to his factual guilt or innocence and
allowing the court to inform the jury of its power to mitigate would
work towards reducing this tension. Such developments would further allow the jury to conduct an individualized assessment of
defendant's moral culpability and the extent to which he was deserving of punishment. 266 On the other hand, it would also lead to
a more inconsistent application of the law by the jury and additional problems of implementation. The Court would need to
decide which values were most consistent with the substance-not
the form-of the Sixth Amendment. But first, the Court needs to
address the question of what that substance is.

266. Presumably, the jury already takes a number of these factors into account when deliberating; the Court just refuses to explicitly endorse the practice or provide the jury with
the full range of information relevant to its decision.

